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CREDIT, CRISES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
DIFFERING FATES OF LARGE AND SMALL BUSINESSES
TODD H. BAKER,* KATHRYN JUDGE** & AARON KLEIN***

ABSTRACT
This Essay sheds new light on the importance of credit creation infrastructure
in determining who actually receives government support during periods of
distress, and who continues to benefit after the acute phase of a crisis and the
government’s formal support programs come to an end. The pandemic revealed,
and the government’s response accentuated, meaningful asymmetries in the
capacities of small and large businesses to access needed funding.
At first glance, it would seem that small businesses benefitted more than large
ones from the government’s pandemic-support programs, as more government
funds flowed into small businesses. Yet closer inspection of the range of
government programs implemented and their longer-term impact reveals a very
different picture. By primarily providing grants to small businesses, the
government helped address their short-term cash flow challenges but did little
to encourage ongoing private credit creation for these businesses. The aid
provided was real but finite in nature. By contrast, the nature of the programs
used to facilitate financing for the largest businesses provided major support at
the moment and created expectations of future support. These interventions
enhanced the viability and attractiveness of inherently fragile intermediation
structures and set them up to continue to provide cheap and easy financing for
the largest businesses long after the acute phase of crisis had passed.
This Essay further reveals how numerous seemingly neutral choices were
anything but in practice, creating a disconnect between policymakers’ stated
aims and the actual impact of many of their actions. A key takeaway is that the
government should do more during times of peace to understand and shape the
credit creation infrastructure in ways that facilitate small business lending in
good times and bad.
*
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay affirms and adds critical nuance to existing understandings of the
way crisis-era programs inevitably shape—and are shaped by—the existing
infrastructure for credit creation. The 2008 financial crisis renewed a longstanding debate about the appropriate role of the government generally, and
central banks in particular, in providing liquidity and other forms of support
during periods of systemic distress. In the wake of that crisis, two dominant
schools of thought emerged. Some focused on the moral hazard that comes from
any government intervention. They feared that government interventions distort
incentives and encourage risk-taking, leading to the conclusion that the
government should rarely intervene, even in the face of severe shocks.1 A related
set of concerns arose around mission creep, as many saw the Federal Reserve’s
(“Fed”) actions as moving it far beyond the roles it was originally designed to
play.2 Others—including key policymakers—took the position that when things
get really bad, the government should provide support almost wherever it could
be useful, to avoid the macroeconomic costs that can arise from the failure of
financial intermediaries and the real economy businesses they help support.3
Strikingly, in contrast to the heated debate triggered by the 2008
interventions, the various programs implemented by the Fed and Treasury to
help financial intermediaries and businesses survive the pandemic have inspired
minimal reflection or debate. An array of valuable efforts to assess empirically
who participated in these programs—particularly the novel Paycheck Protection
Program (“PPP”)—have yet to inspire a broader debate about the significance
of the government’s crisis-era interventions.
In seeking to fill that gap, this Essay charts a course that falls between the two
more established views of the way crisis-era programs are shaped by, and in turn
reshape, financial intermediation infrastructure. We see crisis-era support as
sometimes necessary to protect the long-term health of the economy, and
something that should be provided broadly when critical to maintaining that
health. Yet, we see that as a starting point for discussion, rather than a conclusion
that ends the debate. Looking at 2020 through a lens that is informed but not
fixed by the events of 2008 reveals new and important lessons.
The first is that seeming neutral choices are often anything but. For example,
a primary way that Congress sought to support businesses during the early phase

1
For an overview of this literature, and efforts to address these challenges, see generally
FIN. STABILITY BD., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL REFORMS (2021),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P010421-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BR5L-GHTJ];
Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic
Bailouts, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 60 (2012).
2
See, e.g., LEV MENAND, THE FED UNBOUND: CENTRAL BANKING IN A TIME OF CRISIS
(forthcoming May 2022); Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Bank Activism, 71 DUKE L.J.
247 (2021).
3
See, e.g., TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES
(2014).
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of the pandemic was by having the Treasury support credit creation through Fed
facilities created pursuant to its established authority to make loans to nonbanks
under “unusual and exigent circumstances.”4 On its face, this decision did not
favor any particular industry or business type. In practice, it greatly facilitated
the flow of funds to the largest businesses while doing little for midsized and
smaller businesses. Similarly, in its first effort to implement an innovative new
program to provide support for small businesses, the Treasury favored banks
over financial technology firms (“fintechs”) as the intermediaries through which
these funds should flow.5 This too was a seemingly neutral decision but resulted
in a disproportionate share of the initial funds going to a subset of small
businesses, including larger, older businesses that had existing lending
relationships with banks, while disfavoring smaller, younger, women- and
minority-owned businesses.
These insights also bring lessons. One ramification is the way crisis-era
interventions can and ought to influence the post-crisis regulatory reform
agenda. Second, given that crisis-time support is likely, we argue that
policymakers should use “peace time” to make the infrastructure changes needed
to ensure the smooth flow of money and credit to those who need it most when
crisis strikes.
These insights and implications flow from our analysis of the key decisions
made in early 2020 and the ramifications of those decisions. We begin by
providing a brief overview of the major programs adopted in 2020 to provide
credit or operating support to various types of businesses, with a focus on who
benefited most and the incentives these programs created with respect to
ongoing access to credit once the program ceased.6 Given the exigencies of the
pandemic response, our aim here is not to second-guess policymakers who
responded remarkably fast in the heat of the moment. The pandemic was a
massive, sudden shock, and broad support was critical to minimizing its
4

12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A); see infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
6
Financial assistance came through multiple mechanisms. The two most significant were
the PPP and a fund authorizing the Fed to support the general economy and markets. Both
programs utilized the financial system (banks, capital markets, other lenders) as a conduit to
provide assistance to businesses with the hopes those businesses would, in turn, provide
benefits to workers. There are many employers, and hence employees, who work at entities
that are not “businesses” in both the legal and economic sense. Many of the definitions of
these indirect programs, and some of the programs themselves, were targeted for these types
of employers. For example, the PPP provided money to select nonprofits, including private
schools, and nonprofit lobbying organizations were eventually eligible for PPP assistance.
George E. Constantine & Andrew L. Steinberg, SBA Clarifies Lobbying and Economic Need
Rules for Nonprofit PPP Borrowers, VENABLE LLP (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2021/03/sba-clarifies-rules-for-nonprofitppp-borrowers [https://perma.cc/L2BT-QZPJ]. For purposes of this Essay we will use the
term “business” as more synonymous with “employer,” which is in line with the legal and
regulatory implementation of the emergency assistance, whose purpose was to provide
economic support to employers and employees.
5
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economic impact. But once the acute phases of a crisis wanes, the focus should
shift to the lessons both the crisis and the response might hold. These are the
questions we tackle here.
Putting the pieces together, the analysis suggests that policymakers should
seek to rebalance the scales. Small businesses are a key driver of economic
activity. They support the growth and vitality of our neighborhoods, spark
innovation, and provide a pathway that can help people achieve financial success
and independence.7 Lending to small business often entails greater credit risk,
greater informational challenges, and disproportionately high lender costs
relative to loan size. Complicating these challenges, many of the smallest
business loans sit in the blurry zone between corporate cash-flow loans and
personal loans. Yet these inherent differences are more reason—not less—to be
concerned about the way policy interventions may have inadvertently greased
the wheels on large business lending while leaving small business lending more
exposed to credit shocks.
The analysis also brings to the fore the value of paying greater heed outside
of crisis periods to the ways disparate access to credit shapes who can open a
small business and which small businesses are likely to have access to the
liquidity often needed to weather shocks. People of color make up roughly 40%
of the U.S. population but only 20% of the nation’s 5.6 million business owners
with employees.8 Women make up 51% of the population but only 33% of the
business owners with employees. Minority- and women-owned businesses also
typically have fewer employees and less revenue, and they were less likely to
survive the recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis.9 Although there are
many reasons for these disparities, access to credit and cost of credit may well
be a significant contributor and could well be worse today than it was prepandemic because of the government’s reliance on private infrastructure it did
not fully understand.
Particularly as interest rates start to rise and monetary and lending conditions
tighten, differential access to funding between large business and small, and
within small business, could have far reaching effects. From eating away at the
remarkable recent growth in new small business formation, to contributing to
structural inequities and accentuating the excessive concentration that already
poses a challenge to the long-term health and vibrancy of the economy, credit

7
See Sifan Liu & Joseph Parilla, Businesses Owned by Women and Minorities Have
Grown. Will COVID-19 Undo That?, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/businesses-owned-by-women-and-minorities-havegrown-will-covid-19-undo-that/ [https://perma.cc/59Y3-QYFU] (discussing how minorityand women-owned business enterprises helped stabilize economy during recovery period
after Great Recession).
8
Id.
9
Id.
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creation infrastructure is central to the shape of the economy.10 This Essay brings
to the fore the importance of understanding how the government has shaped that
infrastructure, how it has relied on that infrastructure, why it is likely to do so
again, and why this reliance and support is often in tension with other policy
aims.
I.

THE LATEST CRISIS

The acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis in the spring of 2020 served as a
powerful reminder that existing infrastructure shapes, and ultimately limits, the
government’s ability to provide aid for people and businesses. This relationship
between existing infrastructure and governmental capacity manifested across
most financial and market policy interventions, including direct payments to
individuals and families, unemployment insurance, small business assistance,
and the Fed’s bond purchase and liquidity facilities.
A return to the early stages of the pandemic response, and a review of the
processes through which these programs were adopted, make clear that many of
the ramifications of the government’s interventions were unintended
consequences of the need for the government to move quickly to achieve its
goals, with incomplete information and in reliance on imperfect existing
infrastructure. Although both the speed at which the pandemic hit the economy
and the speed of the recovery were more rapid than the 2008 financial crisis or
other periods of distress, similar dynamics are common during periods of crisis,
and all the more reason to reflect on the structure and adequacy of existing crisis
response tools outside periods of distress.
Just as in 2007 and 2008, the Fed was the first responder in the government’s
effort to contain the economic fallout of the pandemic. To provide
accommodative monetary conditions and ease the unexpected and potentially
massive dysfunction in the Treasury market, the Fed again adopted a program
of quantitative easing (“QE”)—buying up Treasury and mortgage-backed
securities—on an unprecedented scale.11 QE, a tool the Fed first used during the
2008 global financial crisis, at the time was considered radical but now has been

10

THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE MARKETS
279-82 (2019) (discussing statistics regarding highly concentrated markets and negative
relation between labor market concentration and wages).
11
Lorie K. Logan, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at SIFMA
Webinar: The Federal Reserve’s Market Functioning Purchases: From Supporting to
Sustaining (July 15, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org
/newsevents/speeches/2020/log200715 [https://perma.cc/227W-CYZ7]) (“Another important
measure, and the focus of my talk today, is the asset purchases that we have conducted at an
unprecedented scale and speed to support the smooth functioning of markets for Treasury and
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS)—both of which play crucial roles in the American
financial system and economy.”).
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used in the last two recessions.12 Yet the Fed’s purchases of Treasury securities
and agency mortgage-backed securities this time were not only aimed at easing
monetary conditions; they were also used to help ease market dysfunction.13 The
Fed bought $1.7 trillion worth of Treasury securities between March and June
2020.14 To help stem withdrawals from money market mutual funds as COVID19 began to hit financial markets in March 2020, the Fed created the Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility to provide liquidity and financial
assistance to prevent funds from “breaking the buck” and losing value, building
expressly on the same design used in 2008.15 And the Fed also re-adopted many
of the other programs it had used during the 2008 financial crisis to inject
additional liquidity into the market for various financial instruments and to
provide liquidity to both banks and nonbanks.
Through these programs, the Fed supported market functioning and signaled
its continued willingness to prop up key parts of the financial system if needed,
just as it had done in 2008. The similarity in the programs the Fed used was also
a reminder that once the Fed intervenes in a particular way—even if the aim is
to protect market functioning—market participants will often anticipate similar
support in the future. This was the case even in the area of money market mutual
funds, where Congress, the Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Financial Stability Oversight Council had spent substantial time and energy
revamping regulations designed to reduce the need for government assistance in
the name of financial stability.16

12
Ben Bernanke, The New Tools of Monetary Policy, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 4, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2020/01/04/the-new-tools-of-monetarypolicy/ [https://perma.cc/J9T8-2Y9L].
13
Logan, supra note 11 (discussing how Federal Open Market Committee made
substantial purchases of Treasury securities and agency mortgaged-backed securities, and
directed Open Market Trading Desk to make purchases “in the amounts needed to support the
smooth functioning of markets”).
14
Jane E. Ihrig, Gretchen Weinbach & Scott A. Wolla, How the Fed Has Responded to
the COVID-19 Pandemic, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Aug. 12, 2020),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/august/fed-response-covid19-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/J8HC-RY4U] (depicting graph showing how “quickly the Fed ramped up
its purchases of Treasury securities—it bought around $1.7 trillion worth between mid-March
and the end of June”).
15
KENECHUKWU ANADU, MARCO CIPRIANI, RYAN M. CRAVER & GABRIELE LA SPADA,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., THE MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUND LIQUIDITY FACILITY 7, 9
(2021), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr980.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CE66-EMJC] (“Although the type of shock was different, it was natural to
design the 2020 facility based on its 2008 predecessor.”).
16
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets Releases Report on Money Market Funds (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1219 [https://perma.cc/2GC2-JF36] (“The
[President’s Working Group] agrees that while many of the reforms implemented after the
global financial crisis increased market stability, the events of March 2020 show that more
work is needed to reduce the risk that remaining structural vulnerabilities in prime and tax-
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The Fed was not the only major government actor to move quickly and
aggressively. Congress also responded rapidly with a large fiscal stimulus. The
first significant legislative action was the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”)—a $2.2 trillion fiscal stimulus bill
passed at the end of March 2020.17 The CARES Act was designed to provide
fiscal firepower, quickly and in large amounts, to blunt the economic damage of
the pandemic. Direct aid included payments to individuals, state and local
governments, health care providers, and others. This was a traditional Keynesian
economic stimulus,18 largely delivered through existing methods, such as
enhanced unemployment insurance benefits, and through revisions to existing
federal/state matching grant programs providing general-purpose aid to state
governments.
Alongside direct stimulus payments to individuals, expanded unemployment
insurance benefits and specific funds for grants and other types of support for
particular industries, the bill included multiple modes of support for businesses
and their employees. The two provisions of the CARES Act most relevant to the
viability of businesses were the PPP and a separate, innovative effort to have the
Fed and Treasury work together to provide credit support to businesses.
Considering each program in turn, and in context, brings to light the short- and
long-term effects of the support businesses received during this acute phase of
the economic shutdown.
Before doing so, it is worth reflecting briefly on how various government
efforts illuminated the central importance of existing financial infrastructure in
the government’s ability to provide aid quickly to those who needed it. This was
true for the provision of direct assistance as well as credit. The federal
government authorized expanded unemployment benefits, deeming them
critically important to the well-being of qualifying individuals and to the health
of the overall economy. But the ability of people who had lost their jobs to
actually receive the benefits they were owed varied dramatically, largely
depending on the existing apparatus for distributing unemployment payments at
the state level. The apparatus failed miserably in many states, with particularly
well-documented problems in New Jersey and Florida.19 The reasons were
exempt money market funds will lead to or exacerbate stresses in short-term funding
markets.”).
17
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020).
18
See Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud & Chris Papageorgiou, What Is Keynesian
Economics?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2014, at 53, 53 (“The central tenet of [Keynesian economics]
is that government intervention can stabilize the economy[.]”).
19
See Sophie Nieto-Munoz & Matthew Stanmyre, N.J. Failed to Fix Unemployment
System for 19 Years, Records Show. Now Murphy Pleads Patience., NJ.COM (May 14, 2020,
4:32 PM), https://www.nj.com/coronavirus/2020/05/nj-failed-to-fix-unemployment-systemfor-19-years-records-show-now-murphy-pleads-patience.html
[https://perma.cc/6XY8J3T6] (reporting problems with New Jersey’s archaic unemployment website and automated
call system which prevent many New Jersey residents from receiving unemployment
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manifold: outdated computer systems, application backlogs caused by staffing
shortages, and implementation of new federal rules all contributed.20 This led
observers to compare the unemployment payment and processing system to the
classic infrastructure example of “replacing aging water pipes.”21 According to
one estimate, by the end of May 2020, months into the pandemic, only 57% of
the thirty-three million unemployment claims that had been filed were paid,
leaving many unemployed workers and their families in search of other avenues
to scrape by.22 This payment bottleneck delayed the stimulative effect on the
larger economy and increased hardship on families during their time of need.
Similarly, the stimulus “checks” designed to provide aid broadly arrived far
more quickly for those who could receive the funds electronically into their bank
accounts via direct deposit, using IRS taxpayer and tax return data,23 than for the
70 to 100 million people for whom the government either lacked correct bank
account information or was otherwise unable to figure out how to properly send
them their funds.24 This explains why 25% of American households needed to

benefits); Mary Papenfuss, ‘S**t Sandwich’: Florida GOP Reportedly Rigged Jobless Site to
Block Applicants, HUFFPOST (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/floridaunemployment-website_n_5e87b67ec5b6e7d76c63bcf7.
20
Lisa Rowan, Why Is It So Hard to Get Your Pandemic Unemployment Benefits?, FORBES
(Mar. 1, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/why-its-so-hardto-claim-unemployment/.
21
Katherine Landergan, America’s Unemployment System Failed When It Was Needed
Most. Can It Be Fixed?, POLITICO (May 19, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news
/2021/05/19/america-unemployment-system-failed-pandemic-483100
[https://perma.cc
/Y9A8-Y7RC] (“The not-so-sexy topic of unemployment insurance system reform — the
economic equivalent of replacing aging water pipes — has been quietly dominating policy
conversations at every level of government and is about to break into the mainstream.”).
22
See Eli Rosenberg, Workers Are Pushed to the Brink as They Continue to Wait for
Delayed
Unemployment
Payments,
WASH.
POST
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/13/unemployment-payment-delays/
(“By the end of May, about 18.8 million out of 33 million claims — 57 percent — had been
paid nationwide.”); Manuel Alcalá Kovalski & Louise Sheiner, How Does Unemployment
Insurance Work? And How Is It Changing During the Coronavirus Pandemic?, BROOKINGS
INST. (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/20/how-doesunemployment-insurance-work-and-how-is-it-changing-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/9VMG-CNYF] (“Andrew Stettner, a senior fellow at the Century
Foundation, estimates that by the end of May 2020, only about 18.8 million out of 33 million
claims (57 percent) had been paid nationwide, an improvement from 47 percent of claims at
the end of April and just 14 percent at the end of March of 2020.”).
23
See Coronavirus Tax Relief, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/coronavirus-tax-relief-andeconomic-impact-payments [https://perma.cc/L6LS-V8MR] (last updated Feb. 24, 2022).
24
Aaron Klein, Opinion, Want Your Next Stimulus Check Faster? Congress Needs to
Change Just One Line of Law, BROOKINGS INST. (July 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/opinions/want-your-next-stimulus-check-faster-congress-needs-to-change-just-one-line-oflaw/ [https://perma.cc/S2WV-DPDC] (“70 million to 100 million people waited one to three
months for money that eventually arrived as a paper check or debit card.”).
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wait for a physical check or debit card to be delivered to their home despite the
fact that only 5% of U.S. households lack a bank account.25
While ensuring that ordinary Americans get the direct and timely support their
government has promised them is not the focus of our analysis, these examples
help illustrate the fundamental importance of the existing infrastructure—
federal and state, public and private—in shaping the government’s option set
and ability to deliver when crisis strikes.26 With two major crises already this
century, one of the overarching lessons is the importance of considering in
advance the condition of the existing financial infrastructure and acting
preemptively to correct deficiencies and inequities that merit attention.
Addressing these issues can have positive spillover effects and may also help
mitigate distributional challenges when times are good. We now turn to the role
that the existing infrastructure played in the government’s effort to aid
businesses, big and small.
II. THE FED-TREASURY FACILITIES
The CARES Act program that sought to provide the most, and widest ranging,
support for businesses entailed an effort spearheaded by the Fed using support
appropriated by Congress to the Treasury. The program authorized the Fed to
support the broader economy by allocating $454 billion in seed capital, which
allowed the Fed—working with the Treasury—to theoretically buy over $4
trillion in assets.27 This was to be accomplished via lending facilities the Fed
created pursuant to its existing authority under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to make loans to nonbanks in “unusual and exigent
circumstances.”28 The scale of the authorized interventions far exceeded
anything done in response to the 2008 crisis, with the Fed itself lauding its

25

Id.
The contrast with other countries that deliver all benefits directly through dedicated
electronic interfaces, such as India’s e-RUPI, is stark. See John Xavier, Explained: How
India’s New Welfare-Focused Digital Payment System Works?, HINDU (Aug. 8, 2021, 4:50
PM),
https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/e-rupi-how-indias-new-welfarefocused-digital-payment-system-works/article35682640.ece [https://perma.cc/89FZ-BBY7]
(describing India’s e-RUPI system, which “is a digital voucher that can be redeemed by
beneficiaries when they make use of any specific government services” and “does not require
a card, app or internet access to redeem the vouchers”).
27
Prior to the enactment of the CARES Act, the Treasury made a $10 billion equity
investment from the Exchange Stabilization Fund into the Fed’s Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility to support lending of up to $100 billion. Over $4 trillion in asset
purchases or lending could be supported by the $454 billion appropriation assuming
approximately similar leverage ratios. See generally FED. RSRV. BD., TERM ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES LOAN FACILITY (2020) [hereinafter TERM ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES LOAN
FACILITY],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files
/monetary20200323b3.pdf [https://perma.cc/G36K-FBK2].
28
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A).
26
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potential to provide trillions in new loans.29 As the context reflects, these funds
were designed to enable the Fed to provide fresh loans to businesses, nonprofits,
and municipalities. The gap between the amount appropriated and the hoped-for
impact of the related credit facilities reflects the fact that the seed money
allocated by Congress was meant to cover only expected losses, enabling the
Fed to make loans far in excess of the money allocated without suffering a
financial hit itself.
This program positioned the Fed to play a meaningful role in determining who
received support.30 But Congress avoided crossing the Rubicon of having the
Fed directly capitalize the facilities with its own funds by using the Treasury to
capitalize newly created emergency facilities and by retaining the many
limitations on the Fed’s authority already embedded in the Federal Reserve Act,
particularly section 13(3).
Section 13(3) was added to the Federal Reserve Act in 1932 to give the Fed
the ability to lend directly to the real economy in a crisis.31 The Fed, however,
made only modest use of this power during the Great Depression and failed to
use it at all between 1936 and 2008.32 When section 13(3) was invoked by the
Fed in response to the 2008 crisis, it used this authority quite broadly to establish
29
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Takes
Additional Actions to Provide up to $2.3 Trillion in Loans to Support the Economy (Apr. 9,
2020,
8:30
AM),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/monetary20200409a.htm [https://perma.cc/878E-AECJ].
30
Kelsey Snell, What’s Inside the Senate’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package, NPR
(Mar. 26, 2020, 5:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/26/821457551/whats-inside-thesenate-s-2-trillion-coronavirus-aid-package [https://perma.cc/923A-2ECH] (describing how
the CARES Act would provide relief to seven main groups of beneficiaries: individuals, small
businesses, big corporations, hospitals and public health, federal safety net, state and local
governments, and education).
31
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-302, sec. 210, § 13(3),
47 Stat. 709, 715 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343); see also Parinitha Sastry, The
Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y.: ECON.
POL’Y REV., Sept. 2018, at 1, 2 (“[T]he framers of the section intended to authorize credit
extensions to individuals and nonfinancial businesses unable to get private-sector loans. In
other words, Section 13(3) sanctioned direct Federal Reserve lending to the real economy,
rather than simply to a weakened financial sector, in emergency circumstances.”). Between
1932 and 1936, the Fed made a total of $1.5 million in section 13(3) loans. Id. at 27 (“The
Federal Reserve Board renewed the 13(3) authority every six months until July 1936, at which
point the Federal Reserve System had made a cumulative total of 123 loans under the
authority, aggregating to $1.5 million.”). Beyond the limited amount, this fiscal stimulus was
also distinct from 2008 and 2020 because the lending was restricted to commercial enterprises
and did not include nonmember banks or nonbank financial institutions. See id. at 25 (noting
that Fed excluded banks from the term “corporations” and thus section 13(3) does not
authorize lending to nonmember banks).
32
David C. Wheelock, Lessons Learned? Comparing the Federal Reserve’s Responses to
the Crises of 1929-1933 and 2007-2009, 92 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 89, 92 (2010)
(“The Fed made 123 loans totaling a mere $1.5 million in the four years after the section was
added to the Federal Reserve Act in 1932. Section 13(3) was not used again until 2008, when
it became an important tool in the Fed’s effort to limit the financial crisis.” (footnote omitted)).
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new borrowing entities controlled by the Fed that supported many nonbank
financial institutions (and indirectly, their counterparties, including banks), that
had played an important role in the financial bubble that caused the crisis.33
Many of the new section 13(3) facilities the Fed created were designed to
provide fresh liquidity into any array of institutions and sectors of the market
that, in various ways, were part of a new system of market-based intermediation,
often referred to as the shadow banking system. Far more controversially—and
in a move that would be prohibited today—the Fed also used this authority to
facilitate JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns and to help AIG avert
bankruptcy.34
The Fed’s only historical experiment making loans to the real economy was
providing working capital pursuant to what was then section 13(b) of the Federal
Reserve Act. This program was initially created during the Great Depression and
sputtered along until Congress brought it to an end in 1958, with the full support
of then-Fed Chair William McChesney Martin.35 In short, although direct Fed
lending to the real economy was one of many experiments that tried to help the
economy recover from the Great Depression, it is not a tool that has ever been
widely used or that was particularly successful, and it is not one that today’s far
more powerful Fed had ever embraced, until the pandemic response.
In order to understand the impact of the decision to use the Fed to provide
fresh liquidity to businesses in particular, it is helpful to have a rudimentary
understanding of the lending landscape. Large, established corporations have
more options accessing credit than smaller, newer companies. An array of
factors makes the debt of large companies—whether in the form of syndicated
loans or bonds—easier to fund, originate, and hold than that of smaller
companies. Two of the most important challenges are related: smaller businesses
generally present risk profiles more expensive to assess, and smaller companies
generally pose distinct informational challenges.
Large, public companies, on the other hand, are subject to rigorous, ongoing
disclosure requirements, typically have long track records, and benefit from a
body of equity holders who are even more motivated than a company’s debt
holders to monitor the business and prospects of the companies they invest in.
33
See Sastry, supra note 31, at 29 (“In the spring of 2008, Sections 10B and 13(3) formed
the statutory basis for the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort powers for member banks,
nonmember banks, broker-dealer firms, commercial paper issuers, and money market mutual
funds as the Fed moved to bolster a financial system that had arrived at the brink.” (footnote
omitted)).
34
MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY
LENDING 14 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44185.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M5F-N9H2]
(noting that the Fed financed JP Morgan Chase’s takeover of Bear Stearns with $29 billion
federal loan, while “prevent[ing] AIG’s failure by initially providing it a line of credit of $85
billion”).
35
George Selgin, When the Fed Tried to Save Main Street, ALT-M (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.alt-m.org/2020/03/30/when-the-fed-tried-to-save-main-street/ [https://perma.cc
/FH5C-AMB8].
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These companies often issue debt securities that they pay to have rated by rating
agencies, creating free information regarding the credit quality of that debt for
investors to rely on.36 Accentuating the advantage, the past decade has seen a
massive growth in the issuance of collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”),
open-end bond funds, and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) backed by bonds.
These products have helped create ready buyers for newly issued corporate debt
and eased the financing process for large corporations.37 They also create an
intermediation infrastructure that made it easy for the Fed to prop up the
functioning of this overall system, and in ways that seem likely to alter
expectations of future support.
The credit intermediation structure for small businesses is quite different
along many fronts. Even for an established small or midsized business, the
biggest shareholder is often the entrepreneur or family who runs it. The
mechanisms for funneling money from the capital markets into smaller company
debt are far less established, much more sensitive to overall economic
conditions, and far more expensive. Small business lending is often further
complicated in a variety of ways, as lenders typically require multiple years of
business history, personal guarantees, collateral, and other support to reduce
risk. This helps explain why small businesses often have challenges obtaining
capital from outside sources. Only four in nine small businesses report having
obtained credit from a bank in the last five years, according to the Fed’s 2020
survey.38
That financing is already tilted in favor of large businesses—giving them a
meaningful leg up over midsized and small businesses—is all the more reason
to be concerned about the particular microstructure of the mechanisms through
which credit flows to both types of businesses and the impact of the
government’s interventions.
36

Investors who rely exclusively on rating agency opinions may find themselves investing
in assets with greater risk than they realize, as evidenced by the mis-rating of many securities
in the 2008 financial crisis. We express no opinion on the wisdom or efficacy of this reliance,
simply noting that it exists and in the current “originator pays” model, ratings are provided to
investors without cost.
37
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 22
(2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report20191115.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WUE-BU75] (“In line with the discussion of price terms and
risk appetite in section 1, demand for institutional leveraged loans has remained strong and
credit standards have remained weak.”); Antonio Falato, Itay Goldstein & Ali Hortaçsu,
Financial Fragility in the COVID-19 Crisis: The Case of Investment Funds in Corporate
Bond Markets 47 fig.1 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2020-98, 2021),
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_202098.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KFGRLGL] (graphing growing importance of funds in the corporate bond market).
38
FED. RSRV. BANKS OF ATLANTA, BOS., CHI., CLEVELAND, DALL., KAN. CITY,
MINNEAPOLIS, N.Y., PHILA., RICHMOND, ST. LOUIS & S.F., SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY:
2020 REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS 8 (2020), https://www.fedsmallbusiness.org
/medialibrary/FedSmallBusiness/files/2020/2020-sbcs-employer-firms-report
[https://perma.cc/9CPK-3VDE] (graphing lending sources for small businesses).
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Support for the Largest Businesses

During the COVID-19 response, the primary way the Fed supported the
ability of large corporations to access credit was through the creation of two
corporate credit facilities.39 The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility was
created as “a funding backstop for corporate debt” and allowed the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to purchase both qualifying bonds and portions of
syndicated loans at issuance.40 The Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility
allowed the Fed to buy portfolios of bonds and ETF shares that were already
issued and outstanding.41 Both programs were implemented via the creation of
a special purpose vehicle that would hold the bonds and received equity funding
from the Treasury to reduce the credit risk to which the Fed was exposed.42
The mere announcement of the primary and secondary corporate credit
facilities dramatically reduced spreads for investment-grade borrowers.43 The
Fed’s subsequent announcement that it would also buy “fallen angels” (recently
downgraded bonds) and ETFs holding below-investment-grade debt similarly
reduced spreads for companies in these categories.44 The Fed purchased
corporate debt primarily through the creation of a new index it created to track
qualifying bonds.45 The Fed’s large wallet and assured position as a new entrant
into this market drove down the cost of credit for new corporate debt and
provided existing holders of corporate debt a willing counterparty to buy, further
supporting asset prices.46 As a result, the Fed ended up holding the bonds of
39

See Press Release, Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New Measures
to Support the Economy (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm [https://perma.cc/VN53-U3U4].
40
FED. RSRV. BD., PRIMARY MARKET CORPORATE CREDIT FACILITY 1 (2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200728a9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7PP-EZZ7].
41
FED. RSRV. BD., SECONDARY MARKET CORPORATE CREDIT FACILITY 1 (2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200728a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWB9-CAEQ] (describing eligible assets).
42
Id.
43
See Steven Sharpe & Alex Zhou, The Corporate Bond Market Crises and the
Government Response, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-corporate-bond-market-crisesand-the-government-response-20201007.htm [https://perma.cc/SJ7C-GDKR] (describing
how government responded to corporate bond market crises arising from COVID-19); Falato
et al., supra note 37, at 2.
44
Valentin Haddad, Alan Moreira & Tyler Muir, When Selling Becomes Viral:
Disruptions in Debt Markets in the COVID-19 Crisis and the Fed’s Response, 34 REV. FIN.
STUD. 5309, 5333-34 (2021) (showing effects of Fed’s April intervention on some high yield
bonds).
45
See Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, How New Fed Corporate Bond Programs
Dampened the Financial Accelerator in the Covid-19 Recession 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Dall.,
Working Paper No. 2029, 2020), https://www.dallasfed.org/-/media/documents/research
/papers/2020/wp2029.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J2N-ZA95].
46
See id. at 2.
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large, robust companies, many of which had not shown a need for government
support.47
Moreover, the biggest beneficiaries of the Fed’s bond-buying program may
not have been any of the companies whose bonds the Fed acquired, or the
investors whose asset values were artificially boosted, but the intermediaries
through whom these funds flowed. Recall that the growth of open-end bond
funds, CLOs, and ETFs holding bonds had been critical to the growth of the
corporate bond market in recent years and increased leverage in the corporate
sector.48 In the earliest stages of the pandemic, investors were fleeing from these
investments.49 Economists Antonio Falato, Itay Goldstein, and Ali Hortaçsu
document massive and potentially debilitating outflows from corporate bond
funds and ETFs backed by bonds in March 2020, and further show that these
outflows were only slowed and then stanched by the Fed’s announcement of the
corporate credit facilities and its early modifications in the terms of those
facilities.50 According to the Fed, “[e]ven funds specializing in short-term
investment-grade bonds experienced outflows in March totaling eight percent of
assets, dwarfing the selling pressure they saw during the global financial
crises.”51
In stanching these outflows, the Fed helped to save these fragile
intermediaries—each of which promise daily liquidity despite being backed by
very illiquid corporate bonds. This may have prevented investors in these
instruments and corporate bonds from fully appreciating the risks embedded in
them, in part by increasing expectations of further support if needed. If anything,
the Fed’s interventions seem to have led investors to be less concerned than ever
about the fragility of open-end bond funds and the potential for serious losses if
seeking to liquidate bonds, CLOs, or bond ETFs during a period of distress. This
helps to explain why these intermediaries have, and likely will continue, to grow.
As Blackrock—the pioneer in ETFs—stated, “[i]n their biggest test to date,
flagship fixed income ETFs provided deep liquidity, continuous price
transparency and lower transaction costs than were available in individual

47
Jeff Cox, The Fed Is Buying Some of the Biggest Companies’ Bonds, Raising Questions
Over Why, CNBC (June 29, 2020, 5:21 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/29/the-fed-isbuying-some-of-the-biggest-companies-bonds-raising-questions-over-why.html
[https://perma.cc/T2VG-QQLG].
48
GLENN HUBBARD, DONALD KOHN, LAURIE GOODMAN, KATHRYN JUDGE, ANIL KASHYAP,
RALPH KOIJEN, BLYTHE MASTERS, SANDIE O’CONNOR & KARA STEIN, HUTCHINS CTR. ON
FISCAL & MONETARY POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL STABILITY 31 (2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/financial-stability_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7NS-FAKE] (describing effects of rapid growth of bond mutual funds).
49
See id. at 38-39.
50
Falato et al., supra note 37, at 9-10.
51
Sharpe & Zhou, supra note 43.
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bonds. . . . As a result, asset owners — including pension funds and insurance
companies — and asset managers immediately ramped up adoption.”52
It is useful in this context to observe the evolution of the bond market and
corporate debt in the wake of these government interventions. Even though the
amount of outstanding nonfinancial corporate debt was at an all-time high going
into the COVID-19 crisis, it has since increased substantially.53 Data from
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) shows that
“investment grade issuance was strong in March through May 2020 (+178% to
2019 levels on average)” and even though the issuance of high yield debt fell
dramatically in March, it too “had recovered well by May (+60% to 2019
levels)” following the inclusion of many high-yield bonds and ETFs in the
Secondary Market Credit Facility in early April.54 As explained in the November
2021 Financial Stability Report from the Fed, “Corporate bond issuance
remained robust;” “spreads of corporate bond yields over comparable-maturity
Treasury yields . . . remained very narrow relative to their historical
distributions”; “[t]he excess bond premium, which is a measure that captures the
gap between corporate bond spreads and expected credit losses . . . now stands
at the bottom decile of its historical distribution, suggesting elevated appetite for
risk among investors”; and “[i]nvestor sentiment in the leveraged loan market
has remained optimistic.”55 Moreover, despite the outflows from bond ETFs
creating meaningful price dislocations in March 2020, the Fed’s prompt
interventions resulted in total bond ETFs outstanding crossing the $1 trillion
threshold for the first time in the fall of 2020.56 In short, the largest companies
are having little trouble accessing credit on very favorable terms.
Shifting momentarily to look at small business access to credit over the same
period of time reveals a very different picture. According to the 2021 Small
Business Credit Survey conducted by the Fed, 23% of small businesses had
trouble accessing the debt they needed in the past year, only 37% of applicants
received all the financing they sought (down from 51% in the 2019 survey), and
52
A Turning Point for Fixed Income ETFs, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com
/americas-offshore/en/insights/turning-point-in-bond-etf-adoption [https://perma.cc/Q5Q75VB6] (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
53
Patricia Buckley, Monali Samaddar & Akrur Barua, The Pandemic Has Forced
Corporate Debt Higher: But Is That a Bad Thing?, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (July 15, 2021),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/issues-by-the-numbers/rising-corporatedebt-after-covid.html [https://perma.cc/WZ8R-QEKK].
54
See KATIE KOLCHIN, SIFMA INSIGHTS: COVID-19 RELATED MARKET TURMOIL RECAP:
PART II—FIXED INCOME & STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 5 (2020), https://www.sifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/SIFMA-Insights-Market-Turmoil_FI-FINAL-FOR-WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NZ4-M2PN]; Sharpe & Zhou, supra note 43.
55
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 11-13
(2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report20211108.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R3P-SWVR].
56
Ben Johnson, Bond ETF Assets Pass $1 Trillion in October, MORNINGSTAR (Nov. 3,
2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1008706/bond-etf-assets-pass-1-trillion-inoctober.
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13% saw credit availability as the single most important challenge they expect
to face in the next year.57
The implications of these developments are mixed. The good news is that
these interventions helped the economy recover at a remarkable clip once the
early phases of the pandemic waned, despite ongoing public health uncertainty
and related political turmoil.58 Given the uncertainty and the myriad challenges
the pandemic posed, these benefits are hard to overstate. Other implications are
more mixed. One obvious drawback is that the potential systemic threat posed
by open-end bond funds, CLOs, and bond ETFs remains unaddressed while the
sector is poised for further growth, and investor expectations of liquidity
assistance from the government during future crises are likely to distort market
mechanisms and pricing of risk. Moreover, the sharp rise in corporate debt levels
could create debt overhang, potentially impeding investment and growth in the
years ahead.59 And, discussed further below, these interventions could place a
57
FED. RSRV. BANKS OF ATLANTA, BOS., CHI., CLEVELAND, DALL., KAN. CITY,
MINNEAPOLIS, N.Y., PHILA., RICHMOND, ST. LOUIS & S.F., SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY:
2021 REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS 12, 21, 22 (2021), https://www.fedsmallbusiness.org
/medialibrary/FedSmallBusiness/files/2021/2021-sbcs-employer-firms-report
[https://perma.cc/PS9G-P6T6] (summarizing financing outcomes in 2020).
58
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, A Most Unusual Recovery: How the US Rebound from
COVID Differs from Rest of G7, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/12/08/a-most-unusual-recovery-how-the-usrebound-from-covid-differs-from-rest-of-g7/ [https://perma.cc/XA8E-M4NC].
59
Some economists believe that a debt overhang can weigh on aggregate demand via
weaker investment growth. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5
J. FIN. ECON. 147, 147 (1977) (forecasting risks of rising corporate debt levels); Larry Lang,
Eli Ofek & René M. Stulz, Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4
(1996) (discussing potential risk with debt overhang preventing fundraising); Christopher A.
Hennessy, Tobin’s Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment, 59 J. FIN. 1717, 1718 (2005)
(explaining debt overhang theory tested in article); Christopher A. Hennessy, Amnon Levy &
Toni M. Whited, Testing Q with Financing Frictions, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 691, 693 (2007)
(explaining way they tested friction from debt overhang); Murillo Campello, John R. Graham
& Campbell R. Harvey, The Real Effects of Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Financial
Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 470, 486 (2010) (concluding bypassing of net profit value (“NPV”)
projects slows economic growth); Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Firm Leverage,
Consumer Demand, and Employment Losses During the Great Recession, 132 Q.J. ECON.
271, 274 (2017) (describing concern that high leveraged firms are more sensitive to demand
shifts); Sebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Luc Laeven & David Moreno, Debt Overhang, Rollover
Risk, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis 4-5 (Eur. Cent. Bank,
Working Paper No. 2241, 2019), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps
/ecb.wp2241~cbea165b30.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P63C-AF6H] (discussing debt overhang
hurts recovery from crises). Others have challenged this view. See Atif Mian, Amir Sufi &
Emil Verner, Household Debt and Business Cycles Worldwide, 132 Q.J. ECON. 1755, 175758 (2017) (summarizing results that run contrary to other debt overhang arguments); ÒSCAR
JORDÀ, MARTIN KORNEJEW, MORITZ SCHULARICK & ALAN M. TAYLOR, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
N.Y., ZOMBIES AT LARGE? CORPORATE DEBT OVERHANG AND THE MACROECONOMY 1 (2020),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr951.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KRX4-XU2Q] (laying out questioning of debt overhang theory).
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heavier thumb on the financial scale favoring the largest companies relative to
their smaller counterparts in good times and bad.
B.

Fed-Facilitated Support for Midsized and Smaller Businesses

We begin to explore this last issue by comparing the easy access and relatively
low financing costs the largest companies enjoyed during the crisis with the
arguable failure of the Main Street Lending Program and the conspicuous lack
of any program using CARES Act funds to increase credit support for truly small
companies (apart from efforts to implement short-term operating assistance
through the PPP).
The Main Street Lending Program was the Fed’s effort to help companies that
are not large enough to readily access public debt markets.60 Under the Fed’s
former guidelines (the program terminated in January 2021), companies with up
to 15,000 employees or $5 billion in annual revenue (as of 2019) were eligible
to participate.61 These are not small businesses in the “mom and pop” version,
but the definition of small business can be quite expansive, and these businesses
are equally not part of the biggest “big businesses” under the Fed’s definition.
To implement the program, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston set up a special
purpose vehicle to purchase participations in loans originated by banks and their
affiliates (nonbanks were not made eligible by the time the program ended).62
The idea behind the structure was not all that different than what the Fed had
done with corporate bonds; the Fed did not want to be in the position of directly
assessing a company’s creditworthiness, so instead it relied on the existing credit
creation infrastructure to do that. In this case, that meant relying on banks rather
than credit rating agencies or investment fund managers to pick “winners and
losers.”63 The Fed further sought to ensure that banks would identify only
companies that had at least a decent chance of paying back the money borrowed
by requiring the banks that originated the loans to retain some credit exposure
and by imposing other substantive conditions (e.g., limits on the total amount of
debt a company could have relative to its income).64 This is a significant
structural difference from the corporate credit facilities, as bond ETFs are not
required to, and typically do not, hold direct liability to the assets they are

60
Policy Tools: Main Street Lending Program, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm
[https://perma.cc/D8D2-7ST2] (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
61
Mark Kolakowski, Main Street Lending Program, INVESTOPEDIA (July 26, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/main-street-lending-program-4802310
[https://perma.cc/B4TR-LR4S].
62
Policy Tools, supra note 60.
63
See William B. English & J. Nellie Liang, Designing the Main Street Lending Program:
Challenges and Options 22 (Brookings Inst., Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y,
Working Paper No. 64, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06
/WP64_Liang-English_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5U-KMLM].
64
Id. at 2.
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creating for their investors.65 The Fed also set the terms of the loans that would
be extended under the Main Street facility, using a structure that allowed
repayment flexibility in the early years while still requiring full repayment of
principal at a meaningful interest rate.66
Importantly, lenders were told to view the eligibility criteria in the term sheets
as the minimum requirements and were expected to apply their own
underwriting standards in evaluating potential borrowers and conduct an
assessment of each potential borrower’s financial condition at the time of the
potential borrower’s application.67 This was deemed necessary to control risk to
the Fed, despite the money allocated to the Treasury by Congress to absorb
losses and allow greater lending and risk-taking.68 Along with the risk retention
requirement, this criteria and design meant that the Main Street facility did not
provide banks meaningful flexibility to make loans that they would not have
made otherwise or to make those loans on terms that were significantly more
favorable.
The Main Street program was announced in late March 2020 alongside the
two corporate credit facilities.69 In contrast to those facilities, however, there
was no immediate favorable impact on the ability of eligible companies to
actually access the financing they need to survive.70 It was not until July, well
after the Fed had started buying ETFs and a broad array of other corporate debt
generally issued by companies showing no sign of needing any further financial
support, that the Main Street facility even became fully operational.71 Moreover,
the overall impact of the program was far more muted, to say the least.
When announced, Main Street was projected for up to $600 billion in total
loans with $75 billion set aside for potential losses.72 It never got close. Main
Street conducted only 1,830 loans with a total lending of $17.5 billion.73 And
65

See id. at 14-15.
Policy Tools, supra note 60.
67
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., MAIN STREET LENDING PROGRAM:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 9-10 (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.bostonfed.org/mslp-faqs.
68
The Treasury’s expression of an aversion to actually bearing losses may be one reason
why the Fed designed a program that ultimately received little usage and hence had little
potential to actually use the funds allocated.
69
Brian D. Christiansen, Seth E. Jacobsen & Collin P. Janus, Updated Guide to the Main
Street Lending Program, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (June 10, 2020),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/06/updated-guide-to-the-main-streetlending-program [https://perma.cc/S8XB-82RN].
70
Falk Bräuning & Teodora Paligorova, Uptake of the Main Street Lending Program, BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/econres/notes/feds-notes/uptake-of-the-main-street-lending-program-20210416.htm
[https://perma.cc/N5MC-25WE].
71
See id.
72
MARC LABONTE & LIDA R. WEINSTOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11632, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE’S MAIN STREET LENDING PROGRAM (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product
/pdf/IF/IF11632 [https://perma.cc/RVN4-23B4].
73
Bräuning & Paligorova, supra note 70.
66
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roughly half of the entire volume conducted through Main Street occurred in
December 2020, just weeks before the facility ceased accepting loans.74 Putting
this in context, roughly 16% of the total CARES Act $454 billion allocated in
March was set aside for the Main Street program to cover possible lending of
$600 billion to these types of businesses, of which less than $10 billion was
actually advanced by Thanksgiving.75 Even this small amount of support was
not well-targeted, as according to the Fed’s own definitions, approximately 30%
of loans were to industries that were not categorized as “COVID-19 affected.”76
An analysis by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service concluded that
the Main Street facility may well have been “too small to be effective.”77 As
Bharat Ramamurti, a former member of the Congressional Oversight
Commission for the CARES Act and current senior member of the Biden
Administration National Economic Council, put it, “[b]y any measure, the Main
Street program has been a failure.”78
There have been a number of explanations for the relative failure of the Main
Street facility. For example, many borrowers generally felt the terms of the
facility were too restrictive. As noted in a review of the limited lending, “[f]rom
the convoluted eligibility requirements to the prohibition on paying dividends,
the benefits provided from the emergency liquidity (namely, deferred principal
and interest payments) did not outweigh the costs of the strings attached
thereto.”79 Yet, the core challenge grew out of the existing credit creation
infrastructure that the Fed relied on, and in the longer term, the lack of implicit
commitments that resulted from the Fed’s interventions. Ultimately, nothing in
the Main Street facility offered banks sufficiently great upsides relative to risk
to encourage broad lending using this program. This greatly limited the
effectiveness of the program. But, even if the program had been better designed
and more effective, its long-term impact may well have been limited. Because
the program was seen as limited to its terms, and contingent on continuing
support from Congress and the Treasury, its existence did nothing to incentivize
banks to invest further to improve their origination processes and internal
infrastructure for making loans to midsized businesses. This stands in stark
contrast to the corporate bond markets, where the Fed’s interventions—
74
Id. (describing timing of uptake of Main Street lending program). At the end of the day,
less than 3% of potential lending credit was advanced, and the Treasury set aside money to
cover losses in excess of 425% of the total lending that occurred. Id.
75
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
76
See Bräuning & Paligorova, supra note 70 (stating that only “71.4 percent of all Main
Street lending went to COVID-affected industries”).
77
LABONTE & WEINSTOCK, supra note 72.
78
Rachel Siegel, Months into Recession, Fed’s Main Street Loan Program Is at a
Crossroads, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08
/07/federal-reserve-main-street-progral/ (discussing issues with Main Street Loan Program).
79
Nathan Volz, How the Main Street Loan Program Failed Main Street, WIS. L.J. (Mar.,
1, 2021, 1:25 PM), https://wislawjournal.com/2021/03/01/how-the-main-street-loanprogram-failed-main-street/ [https://perma.cc/GMD4-ES7X].
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intentionally or not—seem to have led to expectations of further support in
coming crises.
Shifting to smaller businesses, the Fed created a program that facilitated
implementation of the government’s separate PPP initiative, which, as discussed
below, was designed to provide temporary operating support for small
businesses and those they employed. But it made no attempt to create a true
emergency lending facility that would have increased access to funding for small
enterprises, despite the fact that pandemic-era surveys suggesting that just shy
of half such enterprises were concerned about cash flow and the overall health
of their businesses.
The Fed could perhaps have promoted more enduring credit creation for small
businesses by creating a lifeline for the issuance of asset-backed securities
backed by small business loans. Securitization vehicles allow for the transfer of
risk from the loan originator to the holders of securities backed by those loans,
and securitization vehicles pool risk between multiple individual loans.80 The
Fed recognizes securitization markets as key to credit creation, and re-deployed
a facility in 2020 that it had first used in 2008 to help promote credit creation
via the issuance of asset-backed securities (“ABS”).81 When relaunching the
program, known as the term auction loan facility (“TALF”) in 2020, the Fed
explained the program was “intended to help meet the credit needs of consumers
and small businesses by facilitating the issuance of asset-backed securities.”82
Under the TALF, the Fed agreed to make non-recourse loans secured by ABS,
backed by a wide variety of different assets, including auto loans, student loans,
credit card receivables (both consumer and corporate), equipment loans and
leases, and leveraged loans made to large businesses.83
Yet, when it came to ABS backed by loans to small businesses, the Fed
followed its 2008 precedent to the letter (from a time when fintech and other
nonbank origination of small business loans was negligible) and would accept
such loans only if “guaranteed by the Small Business Administration
[(“SBA”)].”84 These terms not only did little to change banks’ willingness to
extend non-guaranteed small business loans, but they also effectively excluded
billions of dollars in nonbank-originated small business ABS and the lenders
who originated the underlying loans from market support.85 The Fed’s approach
favored some forms of ABS, including CLOs that have become a key

80
See TERM ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES LOAN FACILITY, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing
collateral for recourse loans under Fed loan facility).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Todd H. Baker, Fed’s New TALF Has a Major Gap, AM. BANKER (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:30
PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/feds-new-talf-has-a-major-gap (“Unless the
TALF is changed to include the investment-grade, ABS based on [consumer] loans, lenders
will shut down originations just when they are most needed.”).
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mechanism through which funds flow to the largest businesses, but not others
such as non-guaranteed small business loans and personal installment loans.86
This likely reduced the credit risk to which the Fed was exposed, an
understandable aim much of the time but one that requires greater scrutiny in
light of the funds allocated by the CARES Act. As discussed further below in
connection with the PPP and the small business lending landscape, these
limitations significantly reduced support provided to small businesses during the
earliest part of the pandemic and had the effect of denying the intermediaries
that facilitate funding for small businesses the support akin to that the Fed
provided to open-end bond funds and the other nonbank intermediaries
supporting loans to large businesses.87
Relatedly, the Fed also limited the ABS it was willing to accept based on the
decisions of credit rating agencies.88 Specifically, the Fed required ABS to have
a credit rating in the highest long-term (or, if no long-term rating was available,
the highest short-term) investment-grade rating category from at least two
eligible nationally recognized credit rating agencies, provided that the ABS did
not have a credit rating below the highest investment-grade rating category from
any such agency.89 This requirement contrasts with the inclusion of lower-rated,
noninvestment grade corporate loans and ETFs in the secondary corporate credit
facility. Holding ABS to a higher credit quality standard than corporate loans or
ETFs effectively would have excluded most securitizations of unsecured private
small business loans at the time.90 Again, these types of limitations reduced the
86

See id.; see also Todd Baker & Kathryn Judge, How to Help Small Businesses Survive
COVID-19, at 4 (Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Columbia Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper No.
620, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3643&context
=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/PX4Q-VLXW].
87
Baker, supra note 85 (concluding that unless TALF reformed, Fed “will fail in its goal
of ensuring that credit flows to millions of vulnerable consumers”).
88
Baker & Judge, supra note 86, at 9 (noting “ABS issued by nonbank small business
lenders typically don’t reach” credit rating grade required).
89
Id. at 9.
90
Prior to the pandemic, the highest-rated tranches of small business loan securitizations
by fintechs, such as Kabbage, FundingCircle, Credibly, RapidFinance, and National Funding,
were rated below the highest rating category. See KROLL BOND RATING AGENCY, 2019 SMALL
BUSINESS LENDING ABS YEAR IN REVIEW AND 2020 OUTLOOK 6 (2019); see also KBRA
Assigns Preliminary Ratings to Kabbage Asset Securitization LLC, Series 2019-1 Additional
Notes, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 12, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/20191112005999/en/ [https://perma.cc/3BYG-CFAR]. OnDeck, the only fintech
lender whose ABS had a top rating from one rating agency, suspended all non-PPP lending
to new and existing customers in April 2020 and was subsequently sold for a small percentage
of its historical market capitalization. See Sean Murray, OnDeck Reports Q1 Net Loss of
$59M, Suspends Non-PPP Lending Activities, DEBANKED (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://debanked.com/2020/04/ondeck-q1-earnings-to-be-released/ [https://perma.cc/D5X4QJM3] (“OnDeck has suspended the funding of its Core loans and lines of credit to new or
existing customers (unless the loan agreement has already been executed).”); see also Press
Release, Enova Int’l, Enova to Acquire OnDeck to Create a Leading FinTech Company
Serving Consumers and Small Businesses (July 28, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com
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credit risk to the Fed, but the fact that Congress had provided the Treasury and
Fed, collectively, with substantial loss absorbing capital so that the Fed could
extend credit to impacted sectors of the economy in need undermines the
sufficiency of this explanation for the decisions made. Given then-current credit
market conditions, the Fed’s decisions sharply limited the ability of nonbank
lenders to support their customers with credit and did little to incent bank
lenders—in either the immediate or longer term—to develop or maintain the
infrastructure needed to make small business loans that lacked a government
guarantee.91
The potential economic consequences of the Fed’s decision are significant. In
recent years, more than 61 million individuals—almost half of the U.S.
workforce—worked in a small business, and small businesses collectively
produced 43.5% of U.S. GDP.92 Even more importantly, small businesses have
accounted for 62% of net new job creation since 1995.93 The failure to do more
for these enterprises cannot be readily explained away as lying outside the Fed’s
employment mandate,94 nor does it appear that the Fed is unconcerned about
these companies. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. Chairman Jerome
Powell explained, “The pandemic is presenting acute risks to small businesses”
and when “a small or medium-sized business becomes insolvent . . . we lose
more than just that business.”95 “[T]he heart of our economy and . . . the work
of generations” is at stake.96 The struggles the Fed confronted in its effort to
operationalize both the Main Street facilities show how hard it can be for the
Fed to partner with the lenders who specialize in making these loans, even when
big dollars are involved.
C.

Why the Fed?

Strikingly, given the effect of delegating so much credit creation to the Fed,
there is little sign that Congress had any desire to favor credit creation for large
businesses over midsized and small ones. Given all that the Fed was already
doing to fulfill its core mission of monetary policy while aggressively using
/news-releases/enova-to-acquire-ondeck-to-create-a-leading-fintech-company-servingconsumers-and-small-businesses-301101550.html [https://perma.cc/ZGZ7-JM8C].
91
Baker & Judge, supra note 86, at 2 (discussing Fed’s mechanisms for extending lines of
credit to small business as critical but insufficient).
92
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.: OFF. OF ADVOC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
SMALL BUSINESSES (2021), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12
/06095731/Small-Business-FAQ-Revised-December-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79HGU638] (finding small firms also constitute 39.7% of private sector payroll).
93
Id. (stating 12.7 million net new jobs have been added to economy by small businesses).
94
See id.
95
Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Semiannual
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (June 16, 2020) (available at https://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/testimony/powell20200616a.htm [https://perma.cc/2PFJ-AHXG]).
96
Id.
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emergency authority to stabilize short-term markets, why did Congress lay such
a daunting new challenge on the Fed’s shoulders? Although there are an array
of reasons, one merits particular attention for purposes of our analysis here:
perhaps Congress felt it did not have a better alternative.
As Neil Komesar has illuminated in his work on the importance of “deciding
who decides,” institutional choice is always relative.97 The alternatives facing
Congress in passage of the CARES Act were to: (a) come to a bipartisan,
bicameral compromise and decide itself; (b) empower the President to decide
directly or through a cabinet agency; or (c) empower an alternative institution
such as the Fed. The Fed may be ill-suited to address many of the challenges it
is now being asked to help solve. But it is still better suited to take them on than
administrators closer to the President or Congress through a more detailed set of
appropriations, in extremis earmarking funds to specific projects. The Fed may
be less susceptible to corruption, more competent, more able to make credible
commitments, and more able to act quickly when that is what the situation
requires—all factors that matter with these types of decisions. Examining
Congress, the presidency, and the Fed in broad strokes and then looking at
specific institutional advantages the Fed may possess helps to explain how the
central bank became a key player for providing fiscal support to businesses in a
recession.
Nevertheless, the Fed or the U.S. system of governance generally is not
necessarily well served by this allocation. As Komesar also emphasizes, because
any effort to pursue a substantive aim will be mediated by the processes and
people of the institution charged with implementing that aim, institutional choice
is of utmost importance.98 And the use of the Fed as “quarterback” for relief
efforts—given its institutional culture and the way it interacts, or does not, with
existing “private” mechanisms for credit creation—highlights just how central
infrastructure is in determining who gets help when crisis strikes.
III. OTHER SMALL BUSINESS SUPPORT: PPP
Congress also created other programs to try to help businesses survive the
unprecedented shock of COVID-19.99 The most important program for small
businesses in the early stages of the pandemic was the PPP. This program was
designed to funnel operating assistance to the employees of small businesses and
discourage mass layoffs in addition to helping the owners and operators of those

97

See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (demonstrating importance of allocating
authority to proper institutions).
98
Id.
99
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, With $349 Billion in Emergency Small Business
Capital Cleared, Treasury and SBA Begin Unprecedented Public-Private Mobilization Effort
to Distribute Funds (Mar. 31, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm961
[https://perma.cc/KH7A-S8XL] (describing purpose of PPP as protecting businesses and their
employees).
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businesses weather the storm.100 Small businesses were particularly hard hit in
the early part of the pandemic, as shutdowns were declared and customer traffic
imploded in the country’s business districts.101 According to one study, by May
2020, 34% of small businesses were still closed compared to January 2020.102
The impact on business owners was not consistent demographically.103 For
example, Asian and Black business owners were more highly concentrated in
places, and in industries, with larger declines.104
The PPP was a unique program, unprecedented in U.S. history. With the
avowed goal to assist small businesses and small business employees impacted
by the COVID-19 shutdown, Congress created the PPP and set aside $349
billion of CARES Act appropriations for PPP purposes.105 Congress placed the
Treasury in charge of PPP and directed the SBA to help small businesses qualify
for PPP funding.106 Congress gave the Treasury broad discretion to disburse PPP
funding.107 The PPP was designed to funnel operating assistance to small
businesses to discourage mass layoffs in addition to helping the owners and
operators of those businesses.108 As one of its main sponsors, Senator Marco
Rubio (R-FL) described the program: “PPP had two main goals: help workers
keep their jobs, and protect small businesses from being forced to permanently
close their doors.”109
100

Id.
Iman Ghosh, 34% of America’s Small Businesses Are Still Closed Due to COVID-19.
Here’s Why It Matters, WORLD ECON. F. (May 5, 2021), https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2021/05/america-united-states-covid-small-businesses-economics/ [https://perma.cc
/E5LA-UQF2] (showing large-scale businesses closings across United States in early 2020);
John Eric Humphries, Christopher Neilson & Gabriel Ulyssea, The Evolving Impacts of
COVID-19 on Small Businesses Since the CARES Act 6 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper
No. 2230, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3584745 (showing numerous adverse
impacts on small businesses by April 2020).
102
Ghosh, supra note 101 (listing San Francisco, Boston, and Washington, D.C., as cities
with sharpest decline in small businesses remaining open).
103
DANIEL WILMOTH, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.: OFF. OF ADVOC., THE EFFECTS OF THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON SMALL BUSINESSES 5 (2021), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/02112318/COVID-19-Impact-On-Small-Business.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WLX9-CBJ3].
104
Id.
105
See A July Update on the Paycheck Protection Program, COMM. RESPONSIBLE FOR A
FED. BUDGET (July 10, 2020), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/july-update-paycheck-protectionprogram [https://perma.cc/2769-VWVD] (stating that PPP’s original $349 billion funding
“quickly ran out”).
106
See Press Release, supra note 99.
107
See A July Update on the Paycheck Protection Program, supra note 105.
108
Id.
109
Marco Rubio, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, Opening
Remarks at Congressional Hearing: Small Business in Crisis: The 2020 Paycheck Protection
Program and Its Future (Dec. 10, 2020) (available at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/2020/12/now-rubio-chairs-hearing-on-the-paycheck-protection-program-and-itsfuture [https://perma.cc/3AX8-KVRF]).
101
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The PPP was ostensibly a forgivable loan program run through existing
financial intermediaries, primarily banks and, in the later stages, fintechs110 and
other nonbank lenders. In practice, it functioned as a grant with easily met
conditions.111 Because it too relied on existing infrastructure, assistance—
particularly in the critical early days of the PPP—was principally available to
small businesses with existing relationships with participating lenders.
The PPP was structured to reach businesses using lender financial
intermediaries as the disbursement arm, accessed through PPP “loan”
applications.112 The Treasury then funded such “loans” through the lender to the
applicant. To achieve the dual goals of the program, the “loans” were forgivable
as long as borrowers maintained employee compensation levels.113 Originally
set at 75% for payroll, that figure was reduced to 60% in later legislation.114
Thus, up to 40% of funds supposedly designed to protect paychecks could be
spent on “other eligible expenses.”115 Reflecting the belief at the time that the
economic shutdown would be short, businesses were given eight to twenty-four
weeks to use the funds for those purposes.116 If these criteria were met, the
“loan” was forgiven.117 Thus, the “loan” effectively became a grant.
Economically there is little distinction between a loan that is forgiven if key
conditions are met and a grant that must be repaid if certain conditions are not
met. Both are contingent gifts that require repayment if certain criteria are not
met. Politically there are important distinctions between programs that are
marketed as “loans” compared to those marketed as “grants.” Short-term grant
programs like the PPP are designed to support the status quo without making too
110
For this Essay, we define fintechs as companies that provide credit primarily through
technological platforms (not in-person or store front) and are not chartered banks, credit
unions, or community development financial institutions (“CDFIs”). We define fintechs this
way to juxtapose them with banks, credit unions, and CDFIs. We realize that in the real world
many banks, credit unions, and CDFIs use financial technology extensively, that there are
nonbank lenders that do not operate as fintechs, and that some fintechs are or may be
considering becoming banks, credit unions, or CDFIs. We also recognize that a whole host of
financial technology companies are not lenders but are commonly referred to as fintechs.
111
Paycheck
Protection
Program,
PANDEMIC
OVERSIGHT,
https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/data-interactive-tools/interactive-dashboards/paycheckprotection-program (last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (showing hundreds of billions of dollars
forgiven). As of January 3, 2022, $663.9 billion of the total of $792.6 billion in PPP loans
(83.8%) had been forgiven. Id.
112
A July Update on the Paycheck Protection Program, supra note 105 (“[T]he forgivable
loans were provided through banks and other private financial entities who have collected
billions of dollars in fees for their services.”).
113
PPP Loan Forgiveness, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/fundingprograms/loans/covid-19-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program/ppp-loan-forgiveness
[https://perma.cc/24FD-Q93J] (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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many distinctions and to kick the can down the road until the situation is clearer
or possibly in hopes that a short-term lifeline is all that will be needed for longterm business survival. These grants are expenditures not expected to be
recouped by the provider.118 Loans, by contrast, are intended to be repaid over
time and availability is dependent upon the lender’s assessment of repayment
risk. This was the approach that the Main Street Lending Program followed, as
noted above. The political sensitivity of this distinction is illustrated by the
following counterfactual. Had the PPP grants actually been true loans with an
expectation of repayment, then Congress, the Treasury, or the Fed would have
had to come up with underwriting criteria to control credit risk or delegated
underwriting to lenders (as with the MSLP).
Because loan underwriting necessitates some degree of trying to separate
expected winners from losers—even when the government is ready to absorb
some of the credit risk—using true lending structures to deliver assistance is
challenging even in normal cyclical downturns, and is particularly so in a sharp
crisis when the future direction of the economy is particularly unclear.119 During
the early phases of COVID-19, for example, there were legitimate questions
about whether infections would continue for mere months or many years and
thus whether the economic recovery would be V-shaped, a swoosh, a sawtooth,
or something else entirely.120 There were significant questions about how it
would differentially impact different industries, outside of the obvious areas of
travel and leisure.121 This uncertainty rendered many traditional tools of credit
analysis, temporarily, far less reliable. It can also help explain why neither the
Fed nor the Treasury were anxious to try to take more actions that directly
supported small businesses via true credit extensions. Given Congress’s decision
to have the Fed play a central role in aiding the flow of funds to businesses under
the exigencies of the COVID-19 induced recession, there are still lessons to be
learned for the next crisis, whatever its cause.
The Treasury, in the first stage of PPP, worked with the SBA and a multitude
of banks and credit unions to disburse PPP funds. The government paid fees to
entice banks and nonbanks to originate PPP “loans.” The fees provided to
financial intermediaries facilitated distribution of PPP funds, and banks worked
hard to get money out the door to their customers. Low-cost funding ultimately
provided by the PPP loan fund set up by the Treasury and the Fed coupled with

118

Id.
Jose Maria Barrero, Nick Bloom & Steven J. Davis, COVID-19 Is Also a Reallocation
Shock 29-32 (Becker Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2020-59, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3592953.
120
See, e.g., Baker & Judge, supra note 86, at 2 (“Nor can anyone foresee what the
economy will look like when people emerge from their shelters.”).
121
See id. (“A severe recession is certain, but questions remain about just how deep it will
sear, how long it will last, and how it will reshape the economy that emerges.”).
119
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capital relief provided to banks by regulators provided additional incentives for
financial intermediaries to engage.122
Despite the fact that the initial round of funding was expected to be far shy of
demand, the Treasury decided to make funds available in a “first come, first
served” basis. The result was a rush to seek funding. The entire $350 billion was
given out in fourteen days, beginning April 2, 2020 (barely after the CARES Act
was signed and again before any automatic stabilizer tied to the unemployment
data would have been able to kick in).
The rollout process was chaotic and exposed significant weaknesses in the
SBA’s loan application system. It also created frustration for many of the lenders
attempting to submit and receive approval for applications and the borrowers
seeking funds.123 Getting so much funding out so quickly was no small feat.124
And, interestingly, in light of the push for digital lenders to be included in the
first round, banks succeeded in getting PPP loans for their customers in most
cases by throwing people at the problem instead of automating processes.125
The Treasury made several decisions in implementing PPP that had the effect
of prioritizing larger companies by incentivizing those with preexisting banking
relationships and those asking for larger PPP amounts. “First come, first served”
funding of applications incentivized speed. Speed in application processing is a
function of relationships—borrowers knew where to go for help and banks could
process the requests of existing customers quickly—but equally the result of
bank self-interest. The Treasury also decided to require anti-money laundering
rules, such as Know Your Customer, to be part of the PPP underwriting process.
This burden increased the fixed cost to process PPP applications and the time it
took to gather information from customers who had not previously been subject
to anti-money laundering review. This very likely had the effect of prioritizing
122
Regulatory Capital Rule: Paycheck Protection Program Lending Facility and Paycheck
Protection Program Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 20387, 20387-94 (Apr. 13, 2020) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 217, 324). The bank regulators allowed banks to exclude PPP loans from
regulatory capital calculations. Id.
123
Rebecca Jarvis & Layne Winn, What Went Wrong with the Paycheck Protection
Program, ABC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/insidepaycheck-protection-program-race/story?id=70330643 [https://perma.cc/P4CX-FYKL].
124
Id. (“Collecting the right information, auditing thousands of quickly thrown together
documents, and doing it all under the extreme conditions of the coronavirus pandemic
presented several challenges, but the biggest challenge by far, was submitting the
paperwork.”).
125
David Smith, The Ballad of the Small Banker: An SBA Lender’s Experience with PPP
Loans, FICO: BLOG (May 7, 2020), https://www.fico.com/blogs/ballad-small-banker-sbalenders-experience-ppp-loans [https://perma.cc/8JMT-KD2M] (explaining big banks’
“digital systems are not designed to handle the PPP loan program, and they do not
immediately have the regulatory processes in place to detect risk and fraud for these
circumstances”); Miriam Cross, Small Lenders Embrace Automation for Latest PPP Round,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 13, 2021, 3:16 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/smalllenders-embrace-automation-for-latest-ppp-round (noting PPP distribution prior to
automation was inefficient and cumbersome).
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PPP access for businesses that had previously obtained a loan over those that
just had a transaction account or some other relationship at the bank.126 Finally,
in more of a structural issue than a decision about implementation, the natural
economics of bank/business relationships also tilted the scales toward providing
PPP assistance to preexisting customers who already had outstanding loans from
the bank. By improving the liquidity and solvency of a loan customer receiving
PPP funds, it became less likely that a bank’s outstanding loan would go into
default.
These dynamic factors favored large businesses and those who had been in
business longer.127 It also favored wealthier businesses—that is, the businesses
that were in better financial positions to handle the economic disruption even
without government aid.128 These factors help to explain why in the first round
of PPP allocations to companies seeking $1 million or more, quite a large sum
for what was supposed to cover mainly six to eight weeks of payroll, comprised
44.5% of all PPP funds.129 By contrast, funds for businesses seeking $150,000
or less made up only 27.2% of payouts from all successfully processed PPP
applications.130
This approach disfavored the large number of the smaller businesses that
relied on fintechs and other nonbank lenders for credit and the many very small
businesses who were not actively borrowing prior to the crisis. These categories
include proportionally more minority- and women-owned businesses.131 Given
weaker historical relationships between banks and minority-owned small
126
Aaron Klein & Staci Warden, Anti-money Laundering Rules: An Emergency Assistance
Roadblock, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/antimoney-laundering-rules-an-emergency-assistance-roadblock/
[https://perma.cc/XTG4Y23E] (“When a new small business comes calling, asking for a small two-month loan at a
1% interest rate, the more prudent course from a bank’s risk management perspective, even
with a government guarantee, may simply be to not make the loan at all.”).
127
See MARK E. SCHWEITZER & GARRETT BORAWSKI, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND,
HOW WELL DID PPP LOANS REACH LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME COMMUNITIES? 1-2 (2021),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/newsroom%20and%20events/publications/ec
onomic%20commentary/2021/ec%20202113/ec2021-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VTHD37N].
128
Emily Flitter & Stacy Cowley, Banks Gave Richest Clients ‘Concierge Treatment’ for
Pandemic Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22
/business/sba-loans-ppp-coronavirus.html (describing “two-tiered system” where wealthier
clients had easier loan application process).
129
Aaron Klein, Opinion, The Small Business Relief Program Is Still Broken, POLITICO
(Apr. 27, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/04/27/smallbusiness-relief-206960 [https://perma.cc/Y9VN-S23N].
130
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) REPORT 3 (2020),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/PPP%20Results%20%20Sunday%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3B6-JV3Z].
131
Megan Cerullo, Up to 90% of Minority and Women Owners Shut Out of Paycheck
Protection Program, Experts Fear, CBS NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 3:48 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/women-minority-business-owners-paycheck-protectionprogram-loans/ [https://perma.cc/FTP3-GAYQ].
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businesses and microbusinesses (those with ten or fewer employees), this likely
contributed to such businesses having more difficulty and less overall access to
the first round of PPP funding.132 Although, to be sure, other factors also
contributed to the disparities in who actually received funding.133
In initially using banks as the primary distribution channel, the Treasury
seemingly paid little heed to how various small businesses access funding and
how the small business credit market has changed since 2008. As two of us noted
before those decisions were made, “Banks aren’t the only source of credit for
true small businesses anymore, especially the type of very small ‘Mom & Pop’
corner stores, laundromats, beauty salons, and coffee and sandwich shops that
line main streets.”134 Over the last decade, the smallest enterprises have
increasingly turned to online lenders for their credit needs.135 The 2019 Federal
Reserve Banks’ Small Business Credit Survey indicated that, in 2018, nearly
one-third of small businesses that applied for credit sought it from an online
lender (the type of lender we describe here as a fintech).136 For less traditionally
credit-worthy businesses, the number was closer to one-half.137 Despite an
average loan size much smaller than that of a typical bank,138 online lenders
extended more than $20 billion in loans to small businesses in 2019, owing
overwhelmingly to very small enterprises.139 Combined with the approximately
$12-15 billion in aggregate merchant cash advances made to small retail

132
Sifan Liu & Joseph Parilla, New Data Shows Small Businesses in Communities of Color
Had Unequal Access to Federal COVID-19 Relief, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-data-shows-small-businesses-in-communities-ofcolor-had-unequal-access-to-federal-COVID-19-relief/
[https://perma.cc/HRC8-N6Y3]
(supporting conclusion with empirical data that “small businesses in majority-white
neighborhoods receiv[ed] PPP loans more quickly than small businesses in majority-Black
and majority-Latino or Hispanic neighborhoods”).
133
See Humphries et al., supra note 101, at 8-9.
134
Baker & Judge, supra note 86, at 7; see FED. RSRV. BANKS OF ATLANTA, BOS., CHI.,
CLEVELAND, DALL., KAN. CITY, MINNEAPOLIS, N.Y., PHILA., RICHMOND, ST. LOUIS & S.F.,
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: 2019 REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS 16 (2019) [hereinafter
FED. RSRV. BANKS], https://www.fedsmallbusiness.org/medialibrary/fedsmallbusiness/files
/2019/sbcs-employer-firms-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q25K-9HJC] (showing statistical
importance of “nonbank” lenders in survey on small business).
135
FED. RSRV. BANKS, supra note 134, at 16-17 (showing upward trend in online
applications from 2016 through 2018).
136
Id. at iii.
137
Id. (“Medium- and high-credit-risk applicants seeking loan or line of credit financing
were as likely to apply to an online lender as to a large bank (54% and 50%, respectively),
and more likely to apply to an online lender than to a small bank (41%), CDFI (5%), or credit
union (12%).”).
138
Maddie Shepherd, Average Small Business Loan Amounts, Broken Down and
Explained, FUNDERA (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.fundera.com/business-loans/guides
/average-small-business-loan-amount [https://perma.cc/H5X2-W2SF] (noting average small
business loan is $633,000).
139
Baker & Judge, supra note 86, at 7.
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businesses in 2019, nonbank lenders provided somewhere between one-quarter
and one-third of all credit to the smallest businesses.
Racial disparities also appear larger in small business bank lending than in
fintech lending.140 While large banks approve at least some credit for about 65%
of loan applications from White small business owners, this number drops to
45% for Black small business owners.141 In contrast, online lenders approved
credit for around 85% of White-owned small business borrowers versus 83% for
Black-owned borrowers.142 As a result, regardless of intent, it was foreseeable
that in disproportionately relying on banks, the Treasury’s particular approach
to allocating early PPP funding would also disproportionately go to larger,
Whiter small businesses. It was a decision that, albeit neutral on its face, was far
from neutral in practice.
“First come, first served” also resulted in PPP grants that were often
disconnected from the level of COVID-19 infection the business’s home area
was experiencing or how tight state-based lock-down regimes were—both
presumably proxies for negative business impact. For example, Texas
companies received the largest share of any state of initial PPP funding despite
a relative lack of the virus at the time and having far fewer state-based lockdown restrictions.143 The definition of “small business” in the legislation was

140
Mels de Zeeuw & Brett Barkley, Mind the Gap: Minority-Owned Small Businesses’
Financing Experiences in 2018, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-november-consumer-communitycontext.htm [https://perma.cc/RCA2-55ET] (last updated Apr. 27, 2021).
141
Id.
142
Id. (concluding “that minority-owned firms—particularly black-owned firms—
experience greater challenges obtaining or accessing financing and have potentially large,
unmet financing needs”). There is a large disparity in approval rates between White, Black
and Hispanic small business loans in general. FED. RSRV. BANK OF ATLANTA, SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON MINORITY OWNED FIRMS, at iii-v (2019),
https://www.fedsmallbusiness.org/medialibrary/fedsmallbusiness/files/2019/20191211-cedminority-owned-firms-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LQF-9WA7].
On average, Black- and Hispanic-owned firm applicants received approval for smaller
shares of the financing they sought compared to White-owned small businesses that
applied for financing. Larger shares of Black- and Hispanic-owned firm applicants did
not receive any of the financing they applied for—38% and 33%, respectively—
compared to 24% of Asian-owned firm applicants and 20% of White-owned business
applicants. A larger share of White-owned business applicants received approval for all
the financing they applied for: 49%, compared to 39% of Asian-, 35% of Hispanic-, and
31% of Black-owned firm applicants.
Id. Similar issues exist for women-owned businesses, which are less likely to be approved for
business loans than men-owned firms. FED. RSRV. BANKS OF N.Y. & KAN. CITY, 2016 SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON WOMEN-OWNED FIRMS 22 (2017),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/2016/SBCS-ReportWomenOwnedFirms-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K7T-RXHH].
143
Stephen Gandel, Paycheck Protection Program Billions Went to Large Companies and
Missed Virus Hot Spots, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020, 12:54 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
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quite lenient, allowing relatively large publicly traded companies and
professional sports teams to qualify (among the most famous were Shake Shack
and the Los Angeles Lakers).144 As firms were eventually named, a slew of
media stories began, and many firms decided to return the money. The situation
was significant enough that a joint statement by Treasury Secretary Steven
Mnuchin and SBA Administrator Jovita Carranza noted “the large number of
companies that have appropriately reevaluated their need for PPP loans and
promptly repaid loan funds.”145 That same release promised greater scrutiny for
firms that took more than $2 million in PPP.
After the initial round of PPP funding provided in the CARES Act was
quickly exhausted, Congress appropriated another $321 billion in PPP funding
in the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act of April
2020.146 In an apparent attempt to rectify the problems in reaching low-income
and minority communities, $60 billion of that funding was set aside for small
banks, credit unions (defined as assets of under $10 billion), and community
development financial institutions (“CDFIs”) to allocate.147 This decision may
have reflected Congress’s belief that smaller lenders were more likely to be the
conduits to reach these communities. At about the same time, the SBA began
authorizing PPP lending by nonbank CDFIs, fintechs, and other nonbank small
business lenders, further improving access to PPP by the small businesses that
relied on those intermediaries for credit prior to the crisis.
Unfortunately, systems and operational issues persisted, despite efforts to
correct known problems.148 In addition, according to a paper by three economists
at the University of Texas, the inclusion of nonbanks as lenders appears to have
/news/paycheck-protection-program-small-businesses-large-companies-coroanvirus/
[https://perma.cc/Y6S9-VUKT] (explaining that bare-bones application caused disaster).
144
Sarah Hansen, Potbelly, Shake Shack, Axios: Here Are All the Companies Returning
PPP Money After Public Backlash, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2020, 12:38 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/04/29/potbelly-shake-shack-axios-here-areall-the-companies-returning-ppp-money-after-public-backlash/?sh=6b229e497ea0 (noting
that Shake Shack returned $10 million loan and Los Angeles Lakers returned $4.6 million
loan).
145
Press Release, Steven T. Mnuchin & Jovita Carranza, Sec’y & Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Joint Statement on Review Procedure for Paycheck Protection Program Loans
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm991 [https://perma.cc
/885A-UCYB].
146
Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139,
134 Stat. 620 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 9001, 9006, 9009).
147
Id. § 101(d)(2), 134 Stat. at 621.
148
Ben Popken & Stephanie Ruhle, ‘Extremely Disappointing’ and ‘Entirely
Predictable’—Slowdowns and Lockouts Plague Second Round of PPP, NBC NEWS (Apr. 27,
2020, 4:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/extremely-disappointing
-entirely-predictable-slowdowns-lockouts-plague-second-round-ppp-n1193421
[https://perma.cc/G4R4-HK9Y] (“Lockouts, login issues and sluggish systems marred the
Small Business Administration’s loan approval process, with each bank unable to submit
more than a few hundred applications.”).
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increased levels of potential fraud in the program four-fold in the second round,
with some estimates as high as $69 billion total in potentially fraudulent PPP
loans.149
Initial research suggests that reliance on the existing system of financial
intermediaries to distribute PPP support may have resulted in racial bias in
allocation of funding, and focusing on bank size to ameliorate the disparity was
not an effective solution. Economist Sabrina Howell and co-authors found that
Black-owned businesses were less likely to receive PPP funding through a bank,
even after controlling for other variables using standard economic techniques.150
Their study found that 8.6% of total PPP loans went to Black-owned firms, only
3.3% and 5.3% of PPP loans originated by small and large banks, respectively,
went to Black-owned firms, compared to 6.2% at top-4 banks, 10.6% at CDFIs,
and 26.5% at fintech lenders. Overall, fintech lenders were responsible for
53.6% of PPP loans to Black-owned firms in their sample.
According to the authors, a principal reason fintech firms were more
successful in reaching minority-owned firms than smaller banks was their level
of automation.151 The study also found “suggestive evidence that preferencebased discrimination helps to explain lower rates of lending to Black-owned
businesses among smaller conventional lenders.”152 This may help to explain
why Congress’s solution of prioritizing small banks did not rectify the racial
disparities in the first round of funding.153 However, as noted above, other
research suggests that fintechs had their own issues in processing PPP
applications, as they approved significantly more potentially fraudulent loans.154
Using existing lenders in the financial system to allocate funding inevitably
leads to favoritism towards specific subsections of the population, and it often
149

John M. Griffin, Samuel Kruger & Prateek Mahajan, Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate
PPP Fraud? 3 (Mar. 11, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3906395 [https://perma.cc/56AZ-HMNG]) (“Overall, we find
1.41 million questionable loans representing $64.2 billion in capital.”). It would also seem
likely that greater PPP familiarity and preparation time for fraudsters was a contributing
factor.
150
Sabrina T. Howell, Theresa Kuchler, David Snitkof, Johannes Stroebel & Jun Wong,
Automation in Small Business Lending Can Reduce Racial Disparities: Evidence from the
Paycheck Protection Program 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29364,
2022),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29364/w29364.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AFS-EB55] (noting that less than 9% of all loans went to Black-owned
businesses).
151
Id. at 27 (“We argue that varying degrees of automation across lender types help to
explain these patterns. First, we find that racial differences in loan shares across lenders align
with differences in the rates of automation . . . . Second, we show that after conventional
lenders automated their lending processes, their rates of lending to Black-owned businesses
increased substantially.”).
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
Griffin et al., supra note 149, at 24 (noting that 858,820 potentially fraudulent loans
originated from fintech lenders).
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means favoring those who already have a leg up. Just as with the decision to
empower the Fed and Treasury, Congress could have made different decisions
in how to structure PPP, and it could have provided more guidance to the
Treasury to minimize some of the disparities on display, particularly in the
allocation of the first round of PPP funding.155 There are inevitable tradeoffs
allocating assistance this way, no matter what decisions Congress made,
precisely because it was so dependent on existing private infrastructure given
the limited public alternatives. In choosing to prioritize speed—an
understandable priority under the circumstances—Congress also set the stage
for exacerbating existing inequities in access to credit.
Just as with the decision to ask the Fed to play such a central role in facilitating
the extension of credit to businesses, the choice was among imperfect
alternatives. The scope of the banking system, and the relationships and liquidity
it possessed, at least positioned it to serve as a plausible partner in the
government’s effort to quickly distribute a lot of fresh cash to small businesses
and others that happened to qualify.
A.

The Role of Fintechs and Nonbanks

As discussed above, fintech small business lenders were the main source of
credit for a large and highly vulnerable part of the small business ecosystem that
banks were not serving effectively.156 Unlike banks, fintech small business
lenders were faced with an existential crisis when the COVID-19 pandemic
began. Due to their capital markets-dependent business models, many fintech
small business lenders were forced out of the loan market just when the liquidity
they provide was needed most.157 Many large fintech lenders curtailed or ceased
155

Press Release, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, New PPP Report Shows
Trump Administration and Big Banks Left Behind Struggling Small Businesses (Oct. 16,
2020),
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/new-ppp-report-shows-trumpadministration-and-big-banks-left-behind-struggling
[https://perma.cc/5HHD-R63D]
(identifying three critical failures in implementing PPP in accordance with congressional
intent).
156
Fintech lenders include the new breed of standalone nonbank small business lenders
like FundingCircle, OnDeck, Fundation, Kabbage, BlueVine, Can Capital, StreetShares,
Lendio, and Biz2Credit, as well as more established tech companies like Square, PayPal,
Stripe, Intuit, and Amazon, which include lending as part of their services.
157
Two of the best known fintech lenders, OnDeck and Kabbage, suspended all non-PPP
lending to new and existing customers in April 2020. OnDeck was subsequently sold to
another nonbank lender for a small percentage of its historical market capitalization, while
Kabbage was sold to American Express, a bank. See Murray, supra note 90; Lea Nonninger,
Kabbage Discontinues Lending Operations amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 6, 2020, 9:40 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kabbage-pauses-lendingsuspends-existing-credit-lines-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/C9PF-SYPJ] (noting that Kabbage
did not give borrowers notice before cutting off credit); see also Lawrence Delevingne,
Exclusive: Eyeing Defaults, U.S. Direct Lender Colchis Capital to Shut Funds, REUTERS (Apr.
7, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colchiscapitalexc/exclusive-eyeing-defaults-us-direct-lender-colchis-capital-to-shut-funds-
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lending entirely as their ABS were downgraded and funding costs rose
precipitously.158 In the early stages of the crisis, as a recent paper by Ben-David,
Johnson, and Stulz showed,
[The pandemic] led to a sharp contraction in fintech lending to small
businesses around the onset of the crisis. Digital lending in the second
quarter of 2020 declined by 75% relative to its $16 billion level in the
fourth quarter of 2019. . . . [A]nd out of 16 small business fintech lenders
originating loans before the COVID-19 shock in 2020, only six were still
originating loans in the third quarter of 2020. 159
Strikingly, by contrast, their analysis found “no evidence of an equivalent
collapse in bank loans to small businesses during the same period.”160
This raises important questions about the implications of the decisions by the
Fed and Treasury (in the context of TALF and the first round of the PPP,
respectively) to take actions that effectively limited their capacity to provide
fresh liquidity to fintechs that specialized in small business lending. There are
some practical explanations, but whether those suffice or how informed
idUSKBN21P21X [https://perma.cc/W8KT-CUHN] (explaining decision to shut funds was
based on high risk and uncertainty about future economic recovery); Jennifer Surane & Payne
Lubbers, Online Lenders Fizzling in Crisis with On Deck Agreeing to Sale, BLOOMBERG (July
29, 2020, 10:17 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-29/online-lendersfizzling-in-crisis-with-on-deck-agreeing-to-sale (“On Deck Capital Inc. said late Tuesday it
had agreed to sell itself for $90 million, almost six years after an initial public offering that
valued the online small business lender at $1.85 billion.”); Todd Baker, Marketplace Lenders
Are a Systemic Risk, AM. BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:30 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-risk (noting
that MPL “can’t slow down lending and slash operating costs to stay afloat while collecting
cash from existing loans”); Todd H. Baker, OK, Marketplace Lenders, I’ll Say It: Told You
So, AM. BANKER (May 4, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/okmarketplace-lenders-ill-say-it-told-you-so (“[L]iquidity is everything, institutional money
can’t be relied on, expenses are harder to cut than add, high rates of loan growth aren’t
sustainable and a business model based on volatile gain on sale margins is inherently
unstable.”).
158
Robert Armstrong, Online Lender Stops Making Loans to Small US Businesses, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/c31a20cf-cb17-4958-9454-73763302b5dc
(quoting Kathryn Petralia, Kabbage cofounder and president, as saying “we securitise our
receivables and we are on the hook for loan performance, which is suffering because of
delinquencies, because our customers have no revenue, because they are closed”); KROLL
BOND RATING AGENCY, 10 U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ABS DEALS ON WATCH DOWNGRADE DUE
TO COVID-19 CONCERNS (2020), https://www.krollbondratings.com/documents/report
/32339/abs-u-s-small-business-abs-watch-downgrade-surveillance-report.
159
Itzhak Ben-David, Mark J. Johnson & René M. Stulz, Why Did Small Business Fintech
Lending Dry Up During March 2020? 1 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2021-03014, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3910549 [https://perma.cc
/B4NN-JVZ5]. The authors claimed that the COVID-19 crisis “affected the funding sources
available to fintech lenders and made them financially constrained” in explaining why the
loan supply dried up. Id. at 3.
160
Id. at 1.
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policymakers were about the myriad consequences that were likely to flow from
those decisions remains unclear. For example, with respect to PPP, assuming
that the decision had already been made to require certification of bank-level
anti-money laundering compliance for nonbank lenders included in the PPP,
those lenders might not have been prepared to participate directly in the first
round in any event. Many of the fintech small business lenders that survived the
early stage of the pandemic did so largely by virtue of helping, directly or
indirectly, in the distribution of the PPP funds by banks without acting as
approved lenders or otherwise taking on the primary anti-money laundering
compliance role.161 The speed and simplicity of fintech lenders’ processes were,
at least theoretically, an advantage relative to the often more bureaucratic loan
origination practices of banks, helping to explain why so many fintechs found
ways to work with banks, by generating leads or providing loan origination and
tracking software to allow banks that had previously used manual processes to
convert to digital origination and tracking in the PPP, rather than going it
alone.162
Whatever the reasons, the government’s initial crisis response did little to
support these nonbank lenders, creating a risk not only to them but to the many
161

The CARES Act permits “other lenders” to become licensed to make 100% guaranteed
PPP SBA loans. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L.
No. 116-136, § 1109(b), 134 Stat. 281, 305 (2020). The Interim Final Rule sets out the terms
and conditions on which such lenders may participate in the PPP program. Business Loan
Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20811-17
(Apr. 15, 2020) (codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
162
In fact, many banks relied on fintechs for the software used to process PPP loans.
Darren Hecht, How Independent and Community Banks Used Fintech to Tackle PPP, INDEP.
BANKER (July 8, 2021), https://independentbanker.org/2021/07/how-independent-andcommunity-banks-used-fintech-to-tackle-ppp/ [https://perma.cc/89Z4-FXQY] (describing
how this approach strengthened relationships with clients); Loraine Lawson, Lessons
Learned: PPP Spurs New Automations and Fintech Partnerships, BANK AUTOMATION NEWS
(June 7, 2021), https://bankautomationnews.com/allposts/retail/lessons-learned-ppp-spursnew-automations-and-fintech-partnerships/; Fintech Companies, Lendsmart and Griffin
Technologies, Partner to Improve SBA PPP Loan Process, LENDSMART (May 20, 2020),
https://lendsmart.ai/fintech-companies-lendsmart-and-griffin-technologies-partner-toimprove-sba-ppp-loan-process/ [https://perma.cc/CFA2-CRP8] (explaining how technology
helps banks process loans). A significant portion of the PPP loans made by small and midsized
banks were sourced by fintechs. According to the House Select Committee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, a fintech called Womply worked with seventeen lenders to process 1.4 million or more
PPP loans. Press Release, Select Subcomm. on Coronavirus Crisis, Select Subcommittee
Expands Investigation into Role of FinTech Industry in PPP Fraud (Nov. 23, 2021),
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-expandsinvestigation-role-fintech-industry-ppp-fraud [https://perma.cc/PXA2-3SJJ] (summarizing
reasons for expansion of investigation into fintech’s “facilitation of fraud”). While fintech
lenders had the same incentives as banks to facilitate PPP loans to their existing customers as
a means of reducing potential defaults, they also had significant financial incentives to make
PPP loans to new customers. This is because as monoline lenders become unable to fund
traditional loans and lack other revenue sources, they need the revenue from PPP lending to
“keep the lights on” in their origination operations until conditions improve.
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small businesses that relied on them for funding. This is a classic quandary when
important financial activity moves outside the perimeter of banks and other
prudentially regulated institutions. Usually, migration outside this space—
whether by fintechs, money market funds or open-end bond funds—brings lower
regulatory costs and other flexibility. This can lead to rapid growth accompanied
by reliance on mechanisms that were, by design, not resilient to shocks and not
regulated in the way needed to ensure resilience. Providing support can allow
the fragility to persist but can also be key to protect the real economy actors that
rely on the fragile intermediaries. Although there are no easy or right answers to
these quandaries, the numerous places where this type of interplay is at work
highlights the need to better understand and address these challenges before
crisis strikes.
Ultimately, the Fed and Treasury did provide some short-term assistance to
fintech and other nonbank small business lenders. While they left the TALF
unchanged, late in the first round of the PPP, the Treasury, the Fed, and the SBA
took action to include fintechs and other nontraditional lenders like CDFIs with
direct access both to the PPP and the related Paycheck Protection Program
Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”). However, fintech and other nonbank lenders
remained subject to various specific application requirements and other
conditions (principally related to the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money
laundering compliance)163 that continued to delay and limit their participation
relative to banks.164
When fintechs and other nonbanks were authorized to participate directly in
the PPP at the end of the first phase, they began to reap a larger benefit from the
program. Research conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shows
that fintechs made less than 2% of PPP loans by dollar amount and less than 4%
by number (reflecting lower average loan sizes) in the first phase of the PPP,
with large and small banks making almost all the rest. As fintechs and nonbanks
became eligible PPP lenders, their share of PPP lending by both amount and
number quintupled.165 Nonetheless, the fees provided directly under the PPP and
163

Binoy Dharia & Graham Silnicki, Paycheck Protection Program: Participation by
Non-Bank Lenders, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications
/alert/paycheck-protection-program-participation-non-bank-lenders [https://perma.cc/QP9BDJMQ] (announcing interim rule expanding group of financial institutions permitted to act as
lenders under PPP).
164
See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.: OFF. OF ADVOC., supra note 92 (explaining how to
apply for loan forgiveness); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal
Reserve Takes Additional Actions to Provide up to $2.3 Trillion in Loans to Support the
Economy (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/monetary20200409a.htm [https://perma.cc/HE3M-HXJ6]. Under the PPPLF, established
April 9, 2020, the Fed will extend credit to eligible financial institutions that originate PPP
loans, taking the loans as collateral at face value. While banks are included in the PPPLF at
commencement, the Fed’s release indicates that it is working to include other lenders
originating PPP loans in the near future.
165
Jessica Battisto, Nathan Godin, Claire Kramer Mills & Asani Sarkar, Who Received
PPP Loans by Fintech Lenders?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y. (May 27, 2021),
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in partnerships with banks may well have played a critical role in helping many
fintechs remain viable until conditions improved.
The researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York also found that
fintechs played a critical role in getting PPP funds to Black-owned small
businesses:
Applicants who approached fintech lenders for PPP loans were more likely
to lack banking relationships, be minority owned, and have fewer
employees. Moreover, a higher share of applications by Black-owned
businesses were approved by fintech lenders as compared to firms with
white, Asian, or Hispanic owners. Since Black owners were approved for
loans by fintech lenders at a higher rate even before the pandemic, our
results suggest that historical factors that prevent Black owners from
receiving bank credit continued to operate with the PPP.166
Finally, fintech loans appeared to correlate more closely than bank loans with
areas of particular pandemic need, as measured by death rates. Other research
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York corroborates this.167 For
example, in New York, during the first round of PPP, fintech lenders’ shares of
small loans were almost twice as large in the counties with the highest death
rates as compared to counties with the lowest death rates. By comparison, bank
loan shares were statistically uncorrelated with death rates during the first round
of PPP funding. In subsequent rounds of PPP, loans of all lenders had a similar
correlation with death rates.168
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
This is a complex story where stated goals did not align with routes taken.
Policymakers in Congress, Chairman Powell, and senior Administration
officials suggest an acute and distinct interest in the health of smaller enterprises,
and much money did flow from the federal government into these businesses.
Nonetheless, when the different pieces of government support are put together,
the overall picture that emerges is one that tilted the scales in the opposite
direction, favoring larger businesses.
The decision to rely on lending facilities established by the Fed under its
section 13(3) authority, while neutral on its face, had the effect of doing far more
to facilitate funding for the largest businesses relative to midsized and smaller
ones. Similarly, the Treasury’s decision to favor banks over fintechs in the early
stages of PPP implementation resulted in more funds going to larger, more
established, and Whiter qualifying businesses.

https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/05/who-received-ppp-loans-by-fintechlenders/ [https://perma.cc/HD64-2N7H].
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.

2022]

CREDIT, CRISES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE

1391

These actions have ramifications both for this recession and when the next
shock or severe cyclical recession hits. As a starting point, this highlights the
need for ongoing awareness, engagement, and discussion around the nature of
the public and private credit intermediation infrastructure in place. Although the
perceived lack of better alternatives may help explain Congress’s decision to
rely so heavily on the Fed in its efforts to support businesses, that decision was
far from neutral in its allocational impact. Similar dynamics are at play around
the decision by the Treasury to rely, initially at least, on banks as the primary
conduits for PPP funds.
Another key contribution is to highlight the difference between the funds that
flow from the government to businesses and the extent of government support
provided for a domain. When interventions change the viability of
intermediaries or alter expectations of future support, they can have long-term
ramifications far in excess of the amount of actual support provided. This was
true in 2008 and was a primary defense for interventions that helped stave off
the failure of key financial institutions. This was also a key reason for the many
reforms aimed at eliminating too-big-to-fail subsidies. And it was true again—
although far less discussed, and in slightly different forms—in 2020.
A lot of money flowed into small businesses, but the nature of the PPP
program did little to incent banks or nonbanks to find new and better ways to
underwrite loans to small businesses. Nor is there much sign that the Main Street
Lending Facility incentivized investments in credit intermediation infrastructure
designed to help the midsized businesses that qualified for the program.
By contrast, the Fed’s purchases of corporate bonds in ways that stabilized
open-end bond funds and ETFs holding bonds and its purchases of collateralized
assets in ways that may have aided the functioning of the CLO market are
precisely the types of interventions that can fundamentally alter market
expectations, adding grease to the already well-oiled machine for extending
credit to the country’s largest companies. That so many large companies issued
so much new debt in the wake of these interventions, while so many small
business owners report ongoing problems accessing credit, is a testament to this
disparity.
Having created an expectation of support, the Fed may well feel compelled to
support bond markets and investors yet again, rolling out the array of facilities
created in 2008 and re-deployed in 2020. Whether this happens with specific
congressional authority of the kind provided in the CARES Act or without, as
was the case for many of the programs in the 2008 financial crisis and even in
2020 prior to the enactment of the CARES Act, the structures the Fed uses and
the financial infrastructure the country is operating with will play key roles in
shaping who benefits the most from government intervention.
A.

The Persistent and Evolving Challenge of Small Business Financing

This Essay also informs, although by no means seeks to resolve, the current
debate regarding the appropriate role and regulation of nonbank fintechs in
credit creation. Fintechs burst onto the scene in between 2008 and 2020 and may
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well continue to play a growing role in the extension of credit to small business.
This raises a host of issues. As this Essay reflects, a key challenge to policy
formulation in this area is the role that fintech lenders increasingly play in
providing credit to small businesses. There are also signs that the role of fintech
lenders may be especially salient to very small minority- and women-owned
businesses, whose viability may be of particular importance given persistent
structural inequities. Despite this, the extent to which growing fintech lending
volumes can be explained by lower regulatory burdens, different business
models, historically low interest rates, or other factors has not been adequately
examined by policymakers or academics.
Absent meaningful reform, many of today’s fintechs are poorly situated to
weather a severe cyclical downturn. Without the significant and multifaceted,
although inconsistent, government support provided during the pandemic, far
more fintechs may well have failed. As the pandemic revealed, most fintechs
rely on wholesale funding that dries up quickly during periods of distress. This
liquidity problem will likely be even more acute in a more traditional, longer
lasting cyclical credit downturn where loan performance and economic activity
remain depressed for a lengthy period. This stands in stark contrast to banks that,
because of a different business model and far more rigorous regulation, are better
(even if far from perfectly) situated to make loans through the business cycle.
Now that the acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis has passed, policymakers
should seek to understand and address the challenges that arise from allowing
fragile, capital-market dependent lenders to play such a significant role in the
provision of credit to small businesses.169 There can be little question that
allowing a large portion of lending to a critical area of the economy provided by
companies that are (a) beyond direct federal regulation and (b) doing business
in an inherently fragile and procyclical manner creates structural risks.
Looking ahead, one implication is the desirability of potentially doing more
to facilitate ongoing credit creation for small businesses in peacetime,
particularly those that have traditionally had a harder time accessing financing.
There are a number of possibilities for dealing with this issue, and the best path
forward may well include some mix of these approaches. One possibility would
be to encourage banks to make further investments in their ability and
willingness to lend to small businesses, including those that traditionally have
had a harder time accessing credit. If banks build out the infrastructure and
develop the relationships needed to make these loans, this could enhance credit
access during good times and reduce the likelihood that economic shocks will
overly constrict credit creation for these businesses. The role banks, credit
unions, and CDFIs can play could be assisted by their information advantages,

169

This is just one aspect of a larger problem involving the resiliency of capital markets in
the face of major crises. Commercial paper, Fed funds, and mortgage and other markets also
struggled to function effectively, requiring intervention from the Fed and Treasury.
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knowing their customers and their communities.170 This type of relationship
lending model has faced structural challenges given the rise of lending
commoditization aided by enhancements in capital markets and computing
power, which have driven down costs for certain types of loans that “fit the
standard box,” while making loans to entities that do not fit the box relatively
more expensive for lenders, borrowers, and investors.
How best to facilitate deeper engagement by banks with underserved small
businesses depends on understanding the frictions currently inhibiting robust
extensions of credit by banks to these businesses. Given the risks and costs of
such credit creation, and the positive social benefits of such lending, the
government may well have a role to play. Regulation can and does incentivize
financial institutions’ lending patterns, including creating hurdles to nonstandard or “traditional box” loans. The way the government supports housing
finance by supporting the securitization of certain home loans may well serve as
a model here too, though it may be appropriate for the government to take on
even more risk—in a calculated fashion—than it often does with housing.
A related approach would be for the government to do more to expand the
nonbank, non-fintech mechanisms of getting funding to small businesses. A key
public institution right now is the SBA, which proved vital but also deeply
flawed and limited during the pandemic. A key set of institutions are CDFIs,
many of which are specifically focused on serving underserved populations, and
the unfortunately dwindling number of minority-owned depository institutions.
By enhancing these mechanisms alongside enhancing the ability of banks to
serve small businesses, the government would be better positioned to credibly
warn fintechs that they are unlikely to be utilized in the same way the next time
a crisis strikes, increasing their vulnerability.
Given that a lot of money can be made in good times, particularly when
differential regulatory schemes make it cheaper to be a fintech than a bank
engaging in similar activities, another question is whether fintechs should be
regulated in a manner more akin to banks, including some mix of oversight,
capital regulation, and liquidity regulation.171 The aim need not be perfect
uniformity but ensuring that any set of lenders that are providing capital to
businesses (or households) in sufficient amounts are able to continue to make
170
Congress has already taken some steps in this direction. Legislation signed into law in
December 2020 included $12 billion set-aside for CDFIs and Minority Depository Institutions
(“MDIs”). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182
(2020). Specifically, the law included a $9 billion Emergency Capital Investment Program,
administered by the Treasury, to provide low-cost, long-term capital investments to MDIs and
CDFIs that are depository institutions, with special set-asides for the smallest institutions. Id.
sec. 522, § 104A(b)(1)-(2), 134 Stat. at 2079. In addition, $3 billion was appropriated to
provide grants and other financial and technical assistance to CDFIs, including CDFI loan
funds that serve consumers, small businesses, and nonprofits in their communities. Id.
sec. 523, 134 Stat. at 2087.
171
This same argument could be made about other areas of financial markets, such as
money-market mutual funds, that have repeatedly required government assistance in crises.
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such loans when conditions soften. As things now stand, even shocks far smaller
than March 2020 could lead to meaningful disruptions in credit creation—
harming not only the fintechs who chose to be exposed to such risks but also
their clients, who may not be aware of the risks they are indirectly taking in
choosing to rely on a nonbank lender. Important but beyond our scope, is the
question of whether this is best achieved by compelling fintechs to become
banks, allowing them to do so, or creating an alternative regulatory scheme with
some but not all of the features long associated with bank regulation.
Yet another option would be for Congress to institutionalize direct or indirect
recession lending (e.g., through SBA/CDFI subsidies) by other lenders like
CDFIs focused on the populations heavily served by fintechs, and leave the
fintechs to their fate. Finally, the government could commit to provide ongoing
liquidity support to fintechs in a recession, to allow them to continue to serve
their customers by revising programs like the TALF and to support private small
business lending and securitization funding. This would assist credit creation
without the concomitant oversight and responsibilities that comprehensive
supervision and capital and liquidity rules bring to regulated banking.
Any solution to the fintech liquidity problem needs to take into account the
large populations of small businesses that banks don’t serve today, particularly
small minority- and women-owned businesses. Comprehensive supervision,
“Fair lending”-type antidiscrimination legislation, and programs like the
Community Reinvestment Act have—so far at least—failed to sufficiently
change this dynamic or extend the reach of banks into those populations.
Exempting classes of insured deposit lenders from the Community
Reinvestment Act, such as what was done for credit unions, has arguably made
the situation worse. Unless structural changes to assure small business lending
liquidity in crises also deal with inadequate peace time access to funding for
underserved enterprises, any solution will be incomplete.
B.

Fragility, Funding, and the Largest Businesses

Shifting to large companies, open-end bond funds may be the most vivid
example of an inherently vulnerable product propped up by the Fed’s pandemic
interventions. Corporate bonds are not, and have never been, anywhere near as
liquid as equity instruments. Yet, corporate bond funds promise investors daily
liquidity. Adding to the challenge, the price that investors in open-end bond
funds receive for their shares is also determined by a daily net asset value, a pro
rata share of the estimated value of the bonds held by the fund on the day of
redemption without taking into account the cost of liquidating those bonds. This
structure works fine in normal conditions, as investors are often entering as well
as exiting, and bond funds often hold sufficient Treasury instruments to cover
short-term demands for liquidity. But as March 2020 illustrated vividly, once
liquidity becomes strained, this structure encourages investors to run for the
exit—regardless of their need for liquidity—by allowing those who exit to
impose the cost of liquidation, and corresponding losses, onto the investors who
remain.
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The classic problem of promising short-term liquidity in long-term less liquid
investments is nothing new. Money market mutual funds, corporate bond funds,
and bank deposits are all subject to similar runs. After the Great Depression, the
government largely solved bank deposit runs through a combination of federal
deposit insurance and substantial regulation. After the financial crisis of 2008,
structural changes to money market mutual funds were supposed to have solved
this problem. As then Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo
White stated in 2014, “Today’s reforms . . . . will reduce the risk of runs in
money market funds and . . . . make our markets more resilient and enhance
transparency and fairness of these products for America’s investors.”172 These
reforms failed their initial test in the COVID-19 crisis. Whether any such
reforms are made to corporate bond funds or bond ETFs remains to be seen,
despite the importance of the fragilities revealed. As then-Brookings scholar and
current Treasury Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Nellie Lang remarked
in October 2020,
[T]he success to date of the Fed’s corporate bond program to calm the
markets does not suggest that reforms are not needed. Instead, the reforms
are even more critical, since the Fed’s actions likely raised expectations of
such interventions in the future. It is important that the Fed, through
financial reforms or clarifying its own intent for future emergency actions,
reduce any perception by private entities that they would not have to bear
the costs of their own risk-taking.173
Time will tell whether this wisdom is heeded.
There are an array of tools that could help mitigate these first-mover
advantages,174 and it is beyond our purview to evaluate the right mix. But the
analysis here does highlight that such interventions could be helpful for a
number of related reasons. In addition to addressing a potential threat to stability,
such efforts may be particularly warranted to counteract the impact of the Fed’s
actions during the pandemic. Even when the Fed should intervene to stop the
spread of dysfunction, that it needed to do so is often a flag of a need of further
reforms. When these two are decoupled, interventions can perpetuate the
expectation of further support and accentuate the fragility already embedded in
a market. Moreover, given the ongoing growth of the bond market, addressing
the ways ETFs and open-end bond funds create expectations of liquidity in
markets where it may not exist could help slow that growth.
172

Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules:
Rules Provide Structural and Operational Reform to Address Run Risks in Money Market
Funds
(July
23,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-143
[https://perma.cc/66YY-B5BF].
173
Nellie Liang, Corporate Bond Market Dysfunction During COVID-19 and Lessons
from the Fed’s Response, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/research/corporate-bond-market-dysfunction-during-covid-19-and-lessons-from-the-fedsresponse/ [https://perma.cc/N2KC-JK45].
174
See Hubbard et al., supra note 48, at 67.
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CONCLUSION
The breadth and swiftness of the government’s response to the COVID-19
crisis in 2020 is a testament to the capacity of policymakers to act quickly and
decisively. The economic recovery from the pandemic has been rapid,
particularly when compared with the rest of the world, which largely suffered a
similar shock. Providing meaningful support to virtually all Americans and
increasing the payments made to those who had lost their jobs proved to be not
only the right thing to do but also the wise thing to do. Putting money into the
hands of people who needed to spend it promoted economic activity even as
people were scared, anxious, and leaving their homes far less frequently. It also
played a powerful, even if indirect, role in alleviating strains in the financial
system. Putting money in the hands of people and businesses enhanced their
ability to pay back existing obligations, reducing the losses that banks and other
creditors had to absorb. And the full panoply of government support ensured that
the economy was positioned to grow as the acute phase of the pandemic
subsided.
Yet alongside reflecting on the many lessons learned from previous periods
of systemic distress, the pandemic has its own lessons to teach. Taking a step
back to consider not only what worked and how but also the challenges faced
and the collateral consequences of the actions taken is key to ensuring that
policymakers—and the tools available to them—are ready when the next crisis
hits. America’s financial infrastructure constrained the rapidity and
effectiveness of our policy responses. It led to an uneven set of beneficiaries
among individuals, families, and businesses big and small. Times of crisis
require rapid response, inherently leaning on existing infrastructure. As our
economic response increasingly relies on financial institutions and structures,
the constraints of the institutions and structures will shape the options available
for response as well as the efficacy of policies chosen. This is why non-crises
times are when greater thought and attention are required to improve our
financial infrastructure.

